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PREFACE 
  When court of appeals judges decide a case, they focus on legal 
materials to reach their result. These materials include the case record 
compiled in the trial court or agency; the judgment, decision, or 
verdict under review from the trial court or agency; the precise issues 
that have been raised and preserved by the litigants; the parties’ 
arguments as reflected in written briefs and oral arguments; the 
applicable constitutional, treaty, statutory, rules, or contractual 
provisions; the applicable standards of review; and controlling case 
precedent where applicable. Because we typically sit and hear cases in 
panels of three, appellate judges do not act alone in deciding cases; 
rather, we deliberate—often extensively—to determine the correct 
result in a case. When the relevant legal materials are uncomplicated, 
the issues are uncontroversial, and precedent is clear, judges’ 
deliberations are straightforward and judgments are easily reached. 
  Crucially, court of appeals judges understand that, save when the 
court sits en banc, we are bound by established circuit precedent. And 
we are always bound by Supreme Court precedent in deciding cases. 
The essence of the common law doctrine of precedent or stare 
decisis is that the rule of the case creates a binding legal precept. 
The doctrine is so central to Anglo-American jurisprudence that it 
scarcely need be mentioned, let alone discussed at length. A 
judicial precedent attaches a specific legal consequence to a 
detailed set of facts in an adjudged case or judicial decision, 
which is then considered as furnishing the rule for the 
determination of a subsequent case involving identical or similar 
material facts and arising in the same court or a lower court in the 
judicial hierarchy.1 
  As Justice Cardozo once said, precedents “fix the point of 
departure from which the labor of the judge begins.”2 If precedent 
controls the disposition of a pending case, appellate judges must 
follow it. It does not matter whether an appellate judge agrees with 
established precedent; we are bound to apply established precedent in 
deciding cases before us. And this is precisely what most federal 
appellate judges faithfully do in exercising their responsibilities on the 
bench. 
 
 1. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969–70 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 2. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (Yale Univ. 
Press 1964) (1921). 
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  In some cases, however, the matter under review presents an issue 
of first impression; or the issue before the court is highly complicated 
or controversial; or there is no clearly controlling precedent. In these 
circumstances, deliberations among appellate judges are more 
difficult and there is more room for discretion in the exercise of 
appellate decisionmaking. Appellate cases are idiosyncratic; it is 
therefore hard to generalize meaningfully about their susceptibility to 
determinate resolution. Based on what I have seen during the course 
of twenty-nine years on the bench, however, I have estimated that 
approximately one-half of the cases decided by the courts of appeals 
are “easy”; in other words, the pertinent legal rules seem 
unambiguous and their application to the facts appears clear. A 
dispute falling into this category, I believe, admits of only one “right 
answer.” Were I to vote to decide an easy case in any other way, I 
would expect to be accused of having made an error, not merely of 
having voted or ruled unwisely. Again, using rough estimates, I have 
estimated that in only 5 to 15 percent of the disputes that come before 
me in any given term do I conclude, after reviewing the record and all 
of the pertinent legal materials, that the competing arguments drawn 
from those sources are equally strong. Put differently, only in those 
few cases do I feel that fair application of the law to the facts leaves 
me in equipoise and that to dispose of the appeal I must rely on some 
significant measure of discretion. I view these cases as “very hard.” 
That leaves roughly 35 percent to 45 percent of the cases per year that 
are neither “easy” nor “very hard.” In appeals falling into this middle 
category, each party is able to make at least one legal argument that I 
find colorable, but, after research, reflection, and discussion, the 
argument(s) advanced by one party seem to me demonstrably 
stronger than the argument(s) advanced by the other. Under such 
circumstances, I feel constrained to render judgment in favor of the 
party who has made the more compelling claims.3 
  A “hard” or “very hard” case often results in extended and weighty 
deliberations between the judges who have been assigned to decide the 
case. Judges often start with different “takes” on the correct 
 
 3. I first discussed these ideas in The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections 
on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication. Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in 
Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (1983–84). My general assessment of the breakdown of “easy,” “hard,” 
and “very hard” cases heard by court of appeals judges has remained the same over my twenty-
nine years on the bench. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision 
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1685 (2003) [hereinafter Edwards, Collegiality]; Harry T. 
Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. 
L. REV. 837, 854. 
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disposition. But, after careful analysis of the relevant legal materials, 
thoughtful deliberations more often than not lead to a unanimous 
judgment. Very few federal court of appeals decisions include a 
dissent, which indicates that deliberations are productive. Thus, while 
“hard” and “very hard” cases admit of a measure of judicial 
discretion, that discretion is channeled through a deliberative process 
that, in the vast majority of cases, leads to a consensus opinion as to 
the best legal answer within the adversarial context. 
  Because it is undisputed that some cases admit of discretion in the 
exercise of appellate decisionmaking, scholars and commentators 
sometimes contend that judges must be influenced in their 
decisionmaking by their personal political or ideological 
predilections. This may happen at times. But any assessment of 
appellate decisionmaking that fails to discriminate between forms of 
moral/political reasoning intrinsic to law and those that are extrinsic 
to law is flawed. It is well understood that legal reasoning involves 
moral judgment (not in the form of personal whim or preference, but 
rather in the situated and disciplined elaboration of the conventional 
norms of the American political community) in cases in which judges 
exercise delegated or common law–making authority. Therefore, the 
mere assertion that judges are sometimes influenced by political or 
ideological considerations in their decisionmaking is unilluminating. 
  Legal scholars remain interested in trying to use empirical 
methods—most notably the statistical analysis of case outcomes—to 
understand the effect of extralegal factors on appellate 
decisionmaking. In our view, the principal problem with such 
empirical legal analyses is that they cannot distinguish between legal 
and extralegal factors without considering and accurately accounting 
for the most important determinants of appellate decisionmaking: (1) 
the case records on appeal, (2) the applicable law, (3) controlling 
precedent, and (4) judicial deliberations. By failing to take account of 
these core determinants—in part, perhaps, because they cannot be 
easily or accurately measured—the field of empirical legal studies fails 
to provide a nuanced understanding of how legal and extralegal 
factors interact to generate judicial decisions, and likely 
overemphasizes extralegal factors. These empirical legal analyses are 
also flawed in their failure to take account of “unpublished” decisions 
issued by the federal courts of appeals, which in 2007 constituted over 
80 percent of the cases decided by the appellate courts.4 The omission 
of unpublished decisions almost surely skews results in favor of 
 
 4. See infra note 69. 
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finding greater influence from extralegal factors. It is noteworthy, 
however, that even on their own limited terms, empirical studies 
predict very little about the effects of extralegal factors on appellate 
decisionmaking. 
  This Article is a modest attempt to survey the state of empirical 
analysis of decisionmaking in the federal courts of appeals. In the 
Introduction and Part I, we discuss some of the limitations of 
empirical legal analysis and point out how a number of scholars, in 
their efforts to understand appellate decisionnmaking, have focused 
on the wrong factors. This may explain why empirical studies are not 
able to predict much about appellate decisionmaking. In Part II, we 
consider several studies that attempt to quantify the effects of politics 
and ideology on appellate decisionmaking and highlight the limited 
findings of these studies. Throughout the article (especially in Parts I 
through III), we reject many of the broader conclusions of empirical 
studies that have attempted to assess appellate decisionmaking. First, 
we note that empirical work in this area suffers from several 
important methodological limitations that render bold conclusions 
highly suspect; second, we argue that without considering how judges 
have applied the law and relied on controlling precedent, empirical 
studies cannot meaningfully claim to understand the effects of politics 
and ideology on appellate decisionmaking; and, finally, we contend 
that, because appellate decisions are made by panels, rather than by 
individuals acting alone, studies that fail to take account of judicial 
deliberations are incomplete. 
  In Part III, we conclude that empirical studies predict very little, if 
anything, about the effects of extralegal factors on appellate 
decisionmaking. The hypothesis that judicial decisionmaking is 
influenced by the ideology of judges only implicates extralegal factors 
if and to the extent that any such ideological influence is extrinsic to 
law. However, as we note, empirical studies fail to discriminate 
between forms of moral/political reasoning intrinsic to law and those 
extrinsic to law—in part because the measure of “ideology” is very 
crude, and in part because the role of legal factors is not taken into 
account. Most members of the legal profession—judges, lawyers, and 
scholars—subscribe to a conception of law that encompasses, at least 
in some circumstances, forms of moral or political reasoning. If one 
accepts that such reasoning is legal reasoning, then any statistical 
model that uses a measure of ideology that potentially captures 
reasoning of this sort cannot tell us much about appellate 
decisionmaking beyond the bland assertion that judicial disagreement 
explains variation in outcomes. It cannot disprove the hypothesis that 
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legitimate differences in legal reasoning, properly understood, are 
responsible for the variation. Ideology may inappropriately affect 
variation in legal outcomes only if (a) ideology or politics takes on an 
impermissible, extralegal characteristic—something that empirical 
scholarship has not shown—or (b) we are wrong in our view that 
some political and ideological questions are intrinsic to law itself. 
Thus, empirical scholars can convince us to accept their central claim 
(that extralegal judicial “ideology” explains variation in some legal 
outcomes) only if they first convince us that we are wrong in our view 
that some political and ideological questions are intrinsic to law itself. 
In other words, empirical ideologists must convince us that we should 
adopt a formalistic or “hard” positivistic theory that insists that legal 
questions never appropriately subsume moral or political questions. 
But, of course, if empirical scholars could do this (assuming they 
wanted to), they would not be showing that judges have been 
substituting their ideology for law but, rather, that judges have been 
following a conception of law that we should reject for normative 
reasons. And, if they are right in this, their claim would be recognized 
as a contribution to philosophical jurisprudence, not empirical legal 
studies. 
  In Part IV, I offer some data from the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, with an explanation of how the judges on my court 
go about deciding cases. In doing so, I argue that my colleagues and I 
are committed to applying the law and adhering to controlling 
precedent, not giving vent to our personal political and ideological 
leanings, and that we achieve this goal most of the time. As the data 
show, an overwhelming majority of the decisions of the D.C. Circuit 
are issued without a dissent. This is true in most circuits. 
  In Part V, we briefly explore some new studies that are being 
conducted in an effort to understand the effects of cultural cognition 
on judicial decisionmaking and consider whether such studies will 
produce more nuanced and fruitful results than those that have 
attempted to measure the effects of politics and ideology. We conclude 
with a discussion of the importance of judicial deliberations and note 
that, at least to date, it has been virtually impossible for empirical 
scholars to meaningfully quantify this critical aspect of appellate 
decisionmaking. 
  Finally, it is worth noting that, in writing this Article, we do not 
mean to dispute the reality that presidents often seek to appoint judges 
whose views are consistent with their own. Indeed, when a court is 
composed of judges who come from a variety of professional and 
EDWARDS IN FINAL.DOC 5/25/2009  4:05:32 PM 
1902 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1895 
political backgrounds, this can make for better-informed 
deliberations. Our principal point, however, is that it does not follow 
from the political reality of partisan appointments that judges act in a 
partisan way in deciding cases once on the bench. Rather, what we 
believe is that, on an appellate court that adheres to collegial 
principles, the applicable law, controlling precedent, and the collegial 
deliberative process in appellate decisionmaking are the primary 
determinants of case outcomes. Certainly, no study has shown 
otherwise. 
Harry T. Edwards 
Senior Circuit Judge 
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INTRODUCTION 
The federal judiciary is a uniquely difficult object of scholarly 
inquiry for those committed to empirical investigation. Two points 
are worth stressing. First, “the close study of precedents and their 
impact [on appellate decisionmaking] is impossible with currently 
available or readily foreseeable empirical tools.”5 This is a serious 
issue, because precedents “fix the point of departure from which the 
labor of the judge begins.”6 Second, judicial decisionmaking takes 
place in a closed environment and deliberating judges are bound by 
propriety and ethics to maintain confidentiality. The outputs are clear 
enough—judicial decisions that resolve disputes between litigants 
before the court, determine the rights of parties, and construe and 
apply the nation’s laws. At least some of the inputs—the judgment, 
verdict, or order under review, the record before the appellate court, 
the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, applicable statutory and 
regulatory provisions, and precedent—are published as well. But the 
deliberative process pursuant to which case inputs are transformed 
into a judicial decision cannot be observed by outsiders; nor is there a 
transcript of judges’ deliberations leading to a decision. As a result, 
scholars and other interested parties have no access to the actual 
process of appellate decisionmaking. 
In recent years, there has been a greater effort on the part of 
legal scholars to apply various empirical methodologies to the study 
of judicial decisionmaking. Empirical researchers generally seek to 
provide a clearer understanding of how judicial decisionmaking 
works, rather than to prescribe how judges should make decisions. 
Rather than reading and interpreting judicial opinions in light of 
existing law—the mainstay of traditional legal analysis—these new 
methodologies treat judicial decisions as raw data and then analyze 
these data using statistical techniques. This “empirical legal analysis” 
seeks to describe meaningful relationships between identified 
variables to either prove or disprove particular hypotheses about 
those relationships.7 Judicial decisions are treated largely as 
 
 5. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 202 (2007). 
 6. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 20. 
 7. In this Article, we use a restricted view of “empirical legal analysis.” For our purposes, 
we are referring to the body of literature that applies social science techniques of data analysis 
to legal opinions. Lee Epstein and Gary King, in a wide-ranging critique of empirical work in 
the legal academy, provide a much more expansive definition. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, 
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epiphenomenal responses to extralegal factors (such as “ideology”), 
and the goal of empirical analysis is to measure the effects of these 
factors. 
There are many empirical studies devoted to the decisions of the 
Supreme Court. However, because of the Court’s unique status and 
operating procedures, it is difficult to draw broad conclusions about 
decisionmaking in the federal courts of appeals from studies of the 
Supreme Court. The Court, which is seen by many to play a major 
role in American political life, controls the evolution of federal 
constitutional law, fixes constructions of disputed federal statutes and 
regulations, gives content to federal common law, and has great 
discretion in choosing which cases to hear and resolve. The Court 
hears only a limited number of cases each year, and many of those 
involve high profile, controversial, and difficult legal issues. In 
contrast, the intermediate courts of appeals only occasionally deal 
with very high profile issues. The courts of appeals also hear far more 
cases each year than does the Supreme Court, have only very limited 
control over their dockets, and normally sit in panels of three (not en 
banc). 
The federal courts of appeals are very important in their own 
right, however. Each year they resolve thousands of cases, involving 
many important questions of federal law from which no review is 
taken. Because the courts of appeals have such a large role in the 
development and enforcement of federal law, they have drawn the 
attention of a number of legal scholars interested in using empirical 
methods to understand judicial decisionmaking. 
There have been some notable controversies over the accuracy 
of empirical studies that have sought to measure the effects of 
extralegal factors on decisionmaking in the courts of appeals.8 
 
The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002). Epstein and King invoke a broader 
understanding of “[t]he word ‘empirical’ [to] denote[] evidence about the world based on 
observation or experience. That evidence can be numerical (quantitative) or nonnumerical 
(qualitative) . . . . What makes research empirical is that it is based on observations of the 
world—in other words, data, which is just a term for facts about the world.” Id. at 2–3. 
 8. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2157 
(1998); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 
1335, 1336 (1998); Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1641; Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 
2; William S. Jordon, III, Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the Administrative State: Lessons from 
a Decade of Hard Look Remands of EPA Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 45, 52 (2001); Richard L. 
Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169, 188 (2002) 
[hereinafter Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship]; Richard L. Revesz, 
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However, these debates have tempered in recent years as some 
empiricists have employed more sophisticated techniques, 
acknowledged the limitations of their methodologies, and offered 
more nuanced conclusions that confirm the limited power of current 
methods to predict legal outcomes. Some scholars have even taken 
steps to break from the constraining mind-set of “left-right” partisan 
politics and have attempted to provide richer accounts of how 
individual factors, such as cultural cognition,9 can influence judicial 
decisionmaking. Perhaps most importantly, some empirical 
researchers acknowledge the importance of precedent on judicial 
decisionmaking;10 and concomitantly, a number of researchers now 
give recognition to the role of law in appellate decisions.11 
Despite these recent improvements in empirical studies, 
significant challenges remain. As noted above, in deciding cases, 
appellate judges rely on legal materials and legal reasoning. Appellate 
judges also deliberate with their colleagues before a decision can be 
reached. Given how appellate judges routinely decide cases, it would 
be very difficult to meaningfully assess decisionmaking in the courts 
of appeals without considering the effects of legal materials on the 
decisions reached by appellate panels. As currently structured, 
empirical research also cannot discern whether judges’ political views 
or ideology override the governing law. To make this assessment, 
empiricists would first have to distinguish between forms of 
moral/political reasoning intrinsic to law and those extrinsic to law. 
Were an empirical study able to do this, it might then be possible to 
assess how extralegal factors impermissibly influence judicial 
interpretation of governing law. Until these questions are directly 
investigated, however, attempts to understand appellate 
 
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1771 (1997) 
[hereinafter Revesz, Environmental Regulation]; Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and 
the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REV. 805, 851 (1999); 
Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About 
Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 746 (2005); Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller 
and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 239 (1999); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and 
the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
873, 877 (2008) (book review). 
 9. Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” vs. “Cultural Cognition of” Law: What Difference Does it 
Make? 1 (Harvard Law Sch. Program on Risk Regulation, Research Paper No. 08-22, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1111865. For a discussion of cultural cognition, see infra 
Part V. 
 10. See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 5, at 201–27. 
 11. See, e.g., Sisk, supra note 8, at 876. 
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decisionmaking through empirical studies will remain something of a 
peripheral undertaking. 
Legal scholars understand that studying the effect of precedent 
will be no mean feat: 
More sophisticated statistical models that include legal factors and 
legal reasoning as variables are perhaps the greatest priority in 
continued quantitative examination of the federal judiciary. A fully 
specified legal model will prove eternally elusive [however] because 
legal reasoning is not formulaic in nature: the reasonable parameters 
for debate on the determinate nature of text and doctrine cannot be 
described by number.12 
The deliberative process, which cannot be directly studied, 
further complicates empirical researchers’ attempts to consider the 
effects of precedent on appellate decisionmaking. This is especially 
true in “hard” and “very hard” cases in which the law may be unclear. 
In these cases, the deliberative process takes on added importance. 
Judges, working with the available legal materials, attempt to arrive 
at a shared vision of the law, and a judge’s initial view may change 
several times as it is tested and revised in the face of the competing 
perspectives of his or her colleagues. During deliberations, the 
differing views of three experienced lawyers are—more often than 
not—forged into one. This process can be complex—cognitively, 
sociologically, and psychologically. Empiricists, however, have no 
access to these important confidential exchanges between appellate 
judges during their deliberations over “hard” and “very hard“ cases. 
As a result, when the court issues a unanimous decision in a hard or 
very hard case, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a researcher to 
determine whether and how any individual judge on the panel was 
influenced by extralegal factors. 
There are other important limitations in empirical legal studies. 
These limitations include methodological challenges (including 
questions about translating textual decisions into raw data), as well as 
conceptual issues (including the validity of the attitudinal model of 
judicial behavior discussed in Part I.B infra). A pervasive limitation is 
the lack of a good proxy for judicial ideology, which has caused 
 
 12. Id. at 884. 
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empirical legal scholars to dubiously equate the political party of the 
president who appoints a judge with that judge’s “ideology.”13 
These limitations do not mean that empirical legal studies are 
worthless. Properly done and interpreted, empirical legal studies 
sometimes may illuminate our understanding of judicial behavior. 
However, the limitations of empirical legal studies mean that 
researchers must be “less expansive . . . in drawing conclusions from 
their findings.”14 
I.  LIMITATIONS IN EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
A. Introduction 
Most empirical legal analysis is, from a technical standpoint, 
fairly straightforward. Independent variables are identified and 
compared to an output variable. Where they exist, statistically 
significant correlations are found. However, ascribing meaning to 
those correlations is a much more difficult task. As Professor Cross 
cautions: “[a] reader [of empirical studies] should not place undue 
importance on a finding of statistical significance, because such a 
finding shows a correlation between variables but by itself does not 
prove the substantive significance of that correlation. One must also 
consider the magnitude of the association.”15 Even where a strong 
relationship is shown, the meaning of that relationship may still be 
unclear. It has been argued that “the current state of empirical legal 
scholarship is deeply flawed,” in part because “readers learn 
considerably less accurate information about the empirical world than 
the studies’ stridently stated, but overly confident, conclusions 
suggest.”16 This harsh indictment may be somewhat overstated, but it 
is not fanciful, and any serious claim that empirical legal studies are 
 
 13. Scholars in the field typically refer to variables relating to the appointment process of 
judges, like the party of appointing president, as “ideology” or “ideological variables”—a 
convention we reject. We instead refer to party of appointing president and other such measures 
as “appointment variables.” 
 14. Sisk, supra note 8, at 886 n.72. 
 15. CROSS, supra note 5, at 4. 
 16. Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 6–7. But see Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship, supra note 8, at 188–89 (“[E]mpirical legal scholarship has a great deal to 
contribute to the understanding of law and legal institutions, and social scientists would benefit 
from paying close attention to the methodological innovations performed by legal scholars. 
Because of their flawed methodology and unwarranted criticisms and exaggerations, Epstein 
and King have missed an important opportunity to examine what legal and social science 
empirical scholarship can learn from one another.”). 
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flawed raises an extremely important concern, because most law 
students and members of the legal profession are not trained in the 
nuances and limits of empirical analysis. While empirical scholarship 
can shed light on certain aspects of the judicial process, uninitiated 
readers must understand where the light is shining and which areas 
remain unilluminated. Some empirical scholars are very responsible 
in reporting their findings and, thus, avoid overstating their 
conclusions. But there is still room for improvement, especially given 
the naïveté of many readers who are unfamiliar with the art of 
empirical study and the meaning of statistical concepts. 
In our view, there are two major problems with empirical legal 
studies that aim to understand the effects of extralegal factors on 
appellate decisionmaking. We will first highlight these problems and 
then discuss them in a bit more detail in the subsections that follow 
this introduction. 
First, empirical studies of judicial decisionmaking are too often 
informed by the “attitudinal model” of judicial behavior.17 This model 
posits a stark difference between “legal” and “ideological” decisions, 
and it is premised on the view that the law plays little role in 
structuring judicial decisions. In other words, the attitudinal model 
assumes that judicial decisions are determined principally by the 
political preferences of judges. 
[M]any social scientists—especially political scientists [and some 
legal scholars following their lead]—believe that the “law” boils 
down to outcomes, and that whatever rationales or justifications 
judges invoke are mere smokescreens designed to hide the fact that 
politics drives the result. Political scientists might ask, “Why bother 
to study smokescreens when it is the outcome that matters to all the 
relevant actors, including the judges?”18 
However, as any good lawyer knows, a “focus on outcome to the 
exclusion of law can reach extremes that . . . are mind-boggling”19 and 
is likely to lead to very poor predictive results. 
 
 17. For a description of the attitudinal model, see, for example, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86–97 
(2002). 
 18. Lee Epstein, Nancy Staudt & Peter Wiedenbeck, Judging Statutes: Thoughts on 
Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 305, 320 (2003). 
 19. Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the 
Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 486–87 (2009). Professor Shapiro offers the following 
example of a “mind-boggling” analysis: 
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Unsurprisingly, the attitudinal model, which rests on a simplistic 
liberal/conservative dichotomy, has been sharply criticized. As 
Professor Shapiro argues, 
In the attitudinal model’s starkest form, with its emphasis solely on 
case outcomes, there is no difference, for example, between Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in the recent school desegregation case[, Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,] and 
the plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts. Both 
justices sided with the white plaintiffs in their equal protection 
challenges to integration plans of the Seattle and Louisville school 
districts. But the contents of those opinions are significantly 
different. Justice Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote, explicitly 
rejected the plurality’s “all-too-unyielding insistence that race 
cannot [ever] be a factor” in school district decisions. Despite their 
agreement on “outcome,” the opinions are not uniformly 
“conservative.” And the differences between Kennedy and Roberts 
are likely to be central to the real-world impact of the case.20 
Some contemporary empirical legal scholars have tried to 
construct studies that limit the worst effects of the attitudinal model.21 
However, so long as empirical legal studies draw conclusions based 
on binary liberal/conservative outcomes and follow the attitudinal 
model in failing to account for the effects of law, precedent, and 
deliberations on judicial decisionmaking, these studies will be 
seriously wanting. 
Second, there are several important methodological limitations 
of empirical legal studies. Some methodological limitations—such as 
 
[D]escribing the “apparently unidimensional nature of Supreme Court 
decisionmaking,” two political scientists (including [Harold] Spaeth’s frequent 
co-author Jeffrey Segal) assert in a 2005 article: “The vote on the merits in any given 
case is as straightforward as a majority rule process gets. Justices essentially make a 
binary, reverse or affirm decision.” 
Id. at 486 n.41 (quoting Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Supreme Court, Congress, and 
Judicial Review, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2005)). 
 20. Id. at 486–87 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment)). 
 21. For example, a major problem in many studies premised on the attitudinal model is 
that overly simplistic proxies for “ideology,” such as the party of the president who appointed a 
judge, are often used. Scholars in this area have attempted to develop more sophisticated 
proxies. For example, Cross uses Giles scores to “assign[] relative levels of ideological 
preferences to particular presidents and to the judges that those presidents appointed.” CROSS, 
supra note 5, at 19. However, the use of Giles scores results in only a small, marginal 
improvement over the party-of-the-appointing-president proxy. And naturally, this change does 
not address the issue of the binary nature of outcomes in his or other studies. 
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appropriate data samples—are general and apply to any kind of 
empirical study. Others—such as difficulties that arise when scholars 
attempt to translate the written language of judicial decisions into 
data that are susceptible to mathematical analysis—are more specific 
to the field. For studies that attempt to account for the effects of 
ideology on decisionmaking, there is the recurring problem of 
defining a measurable variable: 
The available methods for measuring the ideology of judges and 
decisions are rough and imperfect. Translating something so 
amorphous as ideology into a numerical measure for quantitative 
analysis will inevitably be imperfect. Moreover, rarely does one have 
the same ideological perspective on all subjects. It is relatively 
common for an individual to be liberal on some social issues and 
conservative on economic issues, for example. In such a case, a 
simple single-point measure will miss much of the individual’s 
ideological preference pattern.22 
B. The Attitudinal Model and Its Role in Empirical Legal Analysis 
1. Historical Context—Simplistic Assumptions about the Nature 
of Law.  The empirical study of legal decisions is not new, and 
contemporary scholarship has been deeply influenced by early work 
in the field. As early as the 1920s, political scientists were using basic 
empirical analyses to support the newly prominent legal realists’ 
perspective on judicial decisionmaking. In an article published in the 
Illinois Law Review in 1922, political scientist Charles Grove Haines 
called for greater scrutiny of extralegal factors in judicial 
decisionmaking: 
[L]egal logic, tradition and precedent, has received extended and 
adequate treatment at the hands of lawyers and political 
scientists . . . [while] the element of free conception, in which 
individual views and personal notions have influenced and have 
frequently predetermined judicial decisions, has received scant 
attention.23 
Haines used an early attempt at empirical analysis to support his 
claim that “individual views and personal notions” influence judicial 
 
 22. Id. at 20. 
 23. Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and 
Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REV. 96, 114 (1922). 
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decisions. Looking to the records of the New York City magistrate 
courts, Haines found significant variations between individual judges: 
In 1916, 17,075 persons were charged before the magistrates with 
intoxication. Of these, 92 per cent were convicted. But . . . one judge 
discharged 79 per cent of this class of cases. In cases for disorderly 
conduct one judge heard 566 cases and discharged one person, 
whereas another judge discharged 18 per cent; another 54 per cent.24 
From these data Haines found that “the magistrates differed to 
an amazing degree in their treatment of similar classes of cases.”25 
Haines thus concluded that it “was inescapable that justice is a 
personal thing, reflecting the temperament, the personality, the 
education, environment, and personal traits of the magistrates.”26 
Haines’ article strikingly foreshadows the development of 
empirical study of judicial decisionmaking. A recent characterization 
of Haines’ pieces notes “its incipient quantitative analysis” as well as 
its “nascent attitudinalism.”27 The second characteristic is important 
because it describes a methodological perspective that has come to 
dominate empirical analysis of judicial decisionmaking. As noted 
above, the attitudinal model holds that judges decide cases on the 
basis of their personal policy preferences; the role of law in 
structuring judicial decisions is assumed to be minimal.28 As described 
by Glendon Schubert—an early innovator in the application of 
empirical techniques to the study of judicial decisions—the attitudinal 
model assumes that jurists have “relatively well-structured attitudes 
toward the recurrent major issues of public policy that confront the 
[Supreme] Court for decision.”29 According to this model, the 
opinions of the Court can best be understood as reflecting the 
attitudes of the Justices. As Schubert put it: 
 
 24. Id. at 105 (citing George Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 90, 98 (1919)). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Nancy Maveety, The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political Science, 
in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 1, 8 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2005). 
 28. See DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 
134–57 (1976); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 17, at 86; Harold J. Spaeth, The 
Attitudinal Model, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 296, 296 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); Frank B. 
Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary 
Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265–79 (1997). 
 29. GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946–1963, at 37 (1965). 
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[G]iven a particular structure of attitudinal relationships among the 
justices, and a set of cases raising questions that correspond to 
degrees of valuation along [those same] . . . attitudinal 
dimensions . . . it is then possible to specify (in theory) how each 
justice voted in each case . . . .30 
Schubert thus argued that cases before the Court present “complex 
stimuli, which (in effect) ask questions about issues to which the 
justices are asked to respond.”31 
An influential gloss on the attitudinal model posits that judges do 
not always vote their preferences, because they may sometimes act 
strategically to maximize their preferences in the long run by voting 
against their preferences in a particular case. Under this model, 
judges exist within an institutional context with “structural constraints 
that, in a collegial decision-making environment, operate to make 
judicial choices about voting or opinion writing interdependent and a 
function of the actors’ strategy for maximizing policy preferences.”32 
This strategic model is fundamentally congruent with earlier 
attitudinal models in that both assume a set of policy preferences in 
the mind of the judge that are stable over time and control the judge’s 
decisionmaking. Whether simply “voting” according to attitudes, or 
acting strategically to maximize preferences, judges’ views on cases 
are assumed to be determined by fixed, predetermined views. 
Since the 1960s, the attitudinal model has been “the major 
approach guiding research into judicial decision making.”33 For those 
interested in pursuing empirical study of judicial decisionmaking, the 
attitudinal model has the advantage of “parsimonious explanation.”34 
The model reduces the number of variables under study to a bare 
minimum and thus holds out the promise of an easy formula for the 
assessment of judicial decisionmaking. However, because the 
attitudinal model trivializes the significance of “law” and fails to 
account for judicial deliberations—matters that are indispensable 
aspects of an appellate judge’s work—the attitudinal model is at best 
a specious account of appellate decisionmaking.35 
 
 30. Id. at 42. 
 31. Id. at 37. 
 32. Maveety, supra note 27, at 25–26. 
 33. Id. at 22. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and Old 
Institutionalisms, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST 
APPROACHES 15, 27 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (discussing how 
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The attitudinal model continues to influence the studies 
undertaken by contemporary legal empirical scholars. Just as Haines 
used rudimentary empirical analysis to test his theory of legal 
realism,36 contemporary scholars (either explicitly or implicitly) use 
empirical analysis to test versions of the attitudinal model. As 
described by Cross: “Judicial politics or ideology is commonly 
juxtaposed with decision making according to law. . . . Whether the 
judge is deciding [cases] according to the better legal arguments or to 
his or her ideology is the question. Quantitative empirical research is 
suited to help answer this question.”37 
The attitudinal model thus structures the hypotheses that many 
empirical studies set out to test. In Haines’s early empirical work, the 
null hypothesis was that the law fully determines outcomes and that 
judges decide all cases according to law.38 This null hypothesis was 
falsified on the basis of data showing different judges who seemed to 
be treating the same types of cases in different ways.39 Therefore, the 
thinking goes, we should reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative—that judges’ personal preferences determine legal 
outcomes. Recent empirical studies, while clearly more sophisticated 
than Haines’s study, rely on a similar model whose premise is that 
either law determines case outcomes, or judicial decisionmaking is 
impermissibly dominated by ideology and politics. 
2. Criticisms of the Attitudinal Model.  The attitudinal model has 
been a consistent target for attack, and for good reasons: it does not 
adequately account for the role of law and precedent in judicial 
 
attitudinalists simply assume that judges “vote their policy preferences and use legal principles 
to mask their true motives”). 
 36. Haines referred to legal realists’ ideas as a conception of “free legal decision.” Haines, 
supra note 23, at 96–102. 
 37. CROSS, supra note 5, at 12, 14. 
 38. Haines’s research agenda was deeply influenced by his views concerning how judges 
make decisions. Haines contrasted two theories of decisionmaking, which he termed the 
“mechanical theory” and the “theory of free legal decision.” Haines, supra note 23, at 96–102. 
The mechanical theory—which today we might refer to as legal formalism—”postulates 
absolute legal principles, existing prior to and independent of all judicial decisions, and merely 
discovered and applied by courts.” Id. at 97. The theory of free legal decision, which Haines 
embraced, postulated “that judicial decisions are affected by the judge’s views of public policy 
and by the personality of the particular judge rendering the decision.” Id. at 102. Haines’s 
theory of free legal decision was deeply influenced by legal realists of his time—Justice Holmes 
and other legal realists are quoted extensively by Haines to support his views of how judges 
make decisions. 
 39. Id. at 105. 
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decisionmaking, it indulges fanciful assumptions about the nature of 
judicial preferences, it fails to account for judicial deliberations, and it 
has an impoverished account of ideology and law. 
 a. Failure to Adequately Account for the Role of Law.  From its 
inception, the attitudinal model has been criticized for misstating the 
role of law and precedent in judicial decisions, and for largely 
ignoring judicial deliberations. For example, shortly after publication 
of Glendon A. Schubert’s The Judicial Mind: the Attitudes and 
Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices 1946–196340—a seminal work in 
the development of the attitudinal model41—a reviewer criticized 
Schubert for “evad[ing]” questions such as whether “the legal 
argument” before the Court might be “so powerful or appealing that 
one’s position on the liberalism-conservatism pragmatism-dogmatism 
scale would have little or no effect.”42 
The attitudinal model is similar to legal realism and critical legal 
studies in that all, to some extent, posit that “legal decisionmaking is 
substantially congruent with decisionmaking simpliciter, and . . . legal 
justification, which attempts to make legal decisionmaking look more 
different from nonlegal decisionmaking than it in fact is, is best seen 
as a form of stylized and post hoc rationalization.”43 Judge Posner has 
forwarded a similar view in his theory of “pragmatic adjudication.”44 
While Judge Posner acknowledges that judges are bound by the law 
when statutes and precedent dispose of the precise question on 
appeal, he also believes that a large percentage of the issues decided 
by the appellate courts do not so precisely fall within the confines of 
existing law. Instead, according to Judge Posner, it is the 
responsibility of judges to “come up with the decision that will be best 
 
 40. SCHUBERT, supra note 29. 
 41. Maveety, supra note 27, at 14. 
 42. Anthony D. Castberg, Book Review, 19 W. POL. Q. 583, 585 (1966) (reviewing 
SCHUBERT, supra note 29); see also Joseph Tanenhaus, The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial 
Decisions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1583, 1591 (1966) (“[T]he application of Schubert’s rules can lead 
to odd results.”). 
 43. Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1096–97 (1997). 
 44. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 20 (1996). Judge 
Posner rejects the attitudinal model as an overly simplistic model of judicial behavior. Richard 
A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1059 (2006) 
[hereinafter Posner, The Role of the Judge]. However, the model that he and Landes use in their 
empirical analysis, discussed in Part II.C, has features that appear to be quite similar to the 
attitudinal model. 
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with regard to present and future needs.”45 The theories underlying 
the attitudinal model, legal realism, critical legal studies, and 
pragmatic adjudication share the view that the law generally does not 
constrain judges in their decisionmaking because it does not provide 
clear answers. 
“Legal formalism”—which posits that “law” is a determinate set 
of rules distinct from political and social factors—often serves as a foil 
for the legal realist and critical legal studies positions (and, by 
extension, the attitudinal model). But the truth of the matter is that 
legal formalism, at least in its most rigid formulation, has not been 
broadly embraced by the judiciary for many decades, if ever. In an 
interesting and illuminating study, Professor Brian Tamanaha 
demonstrates that judges historically have eschewed legal formalism 
and have been quite self-aware of the limits of the law and of their 
own capacities to enforce it: 
Judges as a group have been neither deluded nor duplicitous about 
what is involved in the process of judging. It is time to get over this 
dismissive notion and pay attention to what they are saying, for they 
offer a font of reliable information about what is involved in judging. 
Judges have acknowledged the openness of law and their frailty as 
humans, but steadfastly maintain that this reality does not prevent 
them from carrying out their charge to make decisions in accordance 
with the law to the best of their ability.46 
The point is that even if law draws on interdisciplinary sources in 
judicial decisionmaking, judicial decisionmaking can still retain 
autonomy from illicit extralegal forces. 
We think it is fair to say that most appellate judges, while they 
would acknowledge that the law is unclear in some cases, believe that 
the vast majority of cases in the circuit courts admit of a right or a 
best answer and do not require the exercise of unbridled discretion.47 
 
 45. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 242 
(1999). 
 46. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and Present, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 13–14), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024747. 
 47. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1644; see also Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge, U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of 
Judicial Decision Making, Address at the Symposium on the California Judiciary, Loyola Law 
School, Los Angeles (Mar. 19, 1993), in 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 993, 994 (1993) (“The larger 
reality . . . is that judges exercise their powers subject to very significant constraints.”); Wald, 
supra note 8, at 237 (“At this point I must reveal [the D.C. Circuit’s] ‘dirty little secret’: A large 
portion of our cases (particularly administrative law cases) have no apparent ideology to 
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Moreover, as their published opinions show, most judges reach this 
conclusion without relying on strong formalist claims about what the 
law dictates. In other words, while these judges acknowledge that the 
law has sources of potential indeterminacy, they believe that in most 
instances one legal argument will have greater plausibility within the 
legal community than the others pressed by the litigants. As 
experienced members of the legal community, judges recognize which 
arguments are fundamentally more plausible and decide cases 
accordingly. Deciding cases according to law and precedent, rather 
than personal political or ideological predilections, does not require 
judges to embrace the simpler and less defensible view that law 
absolutely dictates outcomes. Nor does it cause judges to deny that 
moral and political values can at times influence how they read the 
law. This certainly is the case when political or ideological questions 
are intrinsic to the law itself. It does mean that, according to norms of 
professional responsibility and integrity, judges are required to apply 
the law neutrally and to follow precedent as they read it, irrespective 
of how they might prefer a case to come out.48 These norms are 
sufficiently strong—and the law sufficiently clear—that most of the 
time judges are capable of setting aside idiosyncratic readings of the 
law for the one most likely to be embraced by the legal community. 
 b. Questionable Assumptions about Judicial Views and 
Preferences, and the Failure to Account for Judicial Deliberations.  
The attitudinal model also makes strong—and highly contestable—
assumptions about the nature of judicial views and preferences. 
Possibly the most obviously questionable assumption underlying the 
attitudinal model is that an individual judge’s personal views are 
immutable and easily characterized pursuant to a two-dimensional 
left-right axis. For most judges, these are absurd notions—there is no 
reason to think that judges’ preferences are particularly stable, and 
few judges can be easily pigeonholed as consistently “conservative” 
or “liberal” on all issues. 
Furthermore, adherents of the attitudinal model fail to 
comprehend the importance of assessing judges’ work in the context 
of the judiciary’s institutional norms: 
 
support or reject at all—the judges are tasked simply with plowing through volumes of complex 
data and reams of statistical evidence to see if the agency has substantial evidence to back its 
findings or has acted in an arbitrary and capricious way.”). 
 48. See Kozinski, supra note 47, at 995; Sisk & Heise, supra note 8, at 793–94. 
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Individuals who are associated with particular institutions often 
come to believe that their position imposes upon them an obligation 
to act in accordance with particular expectations and 
responsibilities. In other words, institutions not only structure one’s 
ability to act on a set of beliefs; they are also a source of distinctive 
political purposes, goals, and preferences. In fact, it is tempting to 
argue that what makes something a recognizable “institution” is not 
the hard reality of a building but instead some discrete and 
discernible habits of thought, including a set of attitudes about the 
appropriate functions to be performed by people associated with the 
institution . . . .49 
Judges, in their professional roles, differ from other governmental 
actors. The judiciary demands that its members neutrally interpret 
and apply the law and follow precedent. There is a process of 
socialization and acculturation during which new judges join the 
judiciary’s culture in which respect for law is accorded a high value. 
To be sure, there can be no guarantee that a particular judge will be 
affected by group norms of judicial restraint, but few question that 
this process, by and large, produces judges of integrity who have a felt 
obligation to follow the law, adhere to precedent, and faithfully 
engage in judicial deliberations that determine case outcomes based 
on the applicable law and controlling precedent. These obligations 
help mute whatever policy preferences a particular judge may bring 
to the bench, and facilitate neutral interpretation. 
The attitudinal model also fails to take into account deliberation 
between judges. The model focuses on the views of individual judges; 
however, appellate judicial decisions are rendered by three-judge 
panels. The effects of collegiality and interjudge deliberations are not 
accounted for in the attitudinal model of judging.50 Collegial relations 
among judges explicitly embrace the possibility that a judge’s view 
regarding the correct case outcome under the law changes through 
the course of deliberations. If, as judges report, judicial views about 
the correct outcome of a case may change during the course of 
 
 49. Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional 
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra 
note 35, at 1, 4–5. 
 50. See Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1656–57; Deanell Reece Tacha, The “C” 
Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 585, 586 (1995) (“I urge that we go beyond the matrix of 
computerized decisionmaking to consider the qualitative aspects of judicial interaction . . . .”); 
Wald, supra note 8, at 255 (noting that the “formal labeling of judges” by political party “is the 
antithesis of collegial decisionmaking”). 
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deliberations,51 then the attitudinal model ignores a crucial part of 
judicial decisionmaking. 
A related criticism of the attitudinal model is that it is not an 
observation about how judges behave so much as a theory of judicial 
behavior. For example, the so-called “strategic” gloss on the 
attitudinal model assumes that judges have stable preferences on all 
issues, and then posits that they sometimes suppress these preferences 
in the short term to achieve long-term objectives. This gloss aims to 
account for so-called “panel effects,” i.e., empirical studies showing 
variables for some judges that appear to have predictive value for all 
judges on a panel. Many appellate judges would laugh at the 
suggestion that they are participants in such a long-term strategic 
game, in part because judges often cannot remember many of the 
cases that they decided in years past and so could not possibly 
implement “strategies” to gain payback in future cases. 
The strategic gloss on the attitudinal model may simplify 
empirical analysis, but it does not fully and accurately portray how 
judges routinely perform their work or interact with their colleagues. 
There are more straightforward and compelling ways to theorize 
about the data supporting the strategic model: 
Where theorists of the strategic model might see a judge sacrificing 
his or her principles or convictions to respond to colleagues’ 
pressure, [the alternative is to] see a judge who is open and 
responsive to colleagues’ arguments, criticisms, and insights, with 
the result being the thoughtful and efficient development of a 
judicial outcome through the deliberative process.52 
 c. Failure to Meaningfully Define and Measure “Ideology.”  In part 
because of the focus of the attitudinal model on judicial preferences—
largely eschewing the effects of law and precedent, and ignoring the 
impact of judicial deliberations—legal empiricists have expended 
significant efforts in attempting to measure the effect of judicial 
 
 51. See Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1648–52. For a compilation of additional 
sources discussing the influence of collegiality on decisionmaking, see id. at 1641 n.10. 
 52. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1661; see also Richard L. Revesz, Congressional 
Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in 
the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1112 (2001) (stating that “panel effects” can be 
explained by either a “deliberation hypothesis,” pursuant to which judges modify their views 
because they take seriously the views of their colleagues, or a “dissent hypothesis,” under which 
a judge who sits with two colleagues from a different political party moderates his or her views 
in order to avoid having to write a dissent). 
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“ideology” on decisionmaking. Because ideology is difficult (if not 
impossible) to measure directly, scholars have generally used proxies 
for ideology. Typical proxies include some variable associated with 
the appointment process of a particular judge, the most common 
being the party of appointing president.53 In other words, it is assumed 
that judges appointed by Republican presidents are “conservative” 
and judges appointed by Democratic presidents are “liberal.” 
Unsurprisingly, the meanings of conservative and liberal are 
invariably elusive. 
This party-of-appointing-president (“PAP”) proxy measure has 
come under criticism. As an initial matter, it is not the case that “all 
Republican presidents are conservatives and all Democratic 
presidents are liberal.”54 Further, presidents are not solely “motivated 
to appoint judges who reflect their ideologies.”55 Commentators have 
noted alternative motivations for presidents’ judicial choices other 
than ideology, such as personal relationships or party building.56 More 
sophisticated attempts to capture judicial ideology (such as the Giles 
scores used by Cross and discussed more fully below57) only 
marginally improve on the use of PAP as a proxy for ideology. 
Alternative interpretations of correlations between appointment 
variables and case outcome are possible. William Landes and Judge 
Richard Posner argue that 
[i]f the question, for example, is whether Democratic Presidents 
appoint more liberal judges than Republican Presidents do, the 
classification of the votes supplies the answer: If judges appointed by 
Democratic Presidents vote more often for liberal outcomes than 
judges appointed by Republican Presidents, it doesn’t matter 
 
 53. Alternative approaches have been proposed, but have not yet been widely adopted by 
the empirical legal community. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial 
Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2009) 
(manuscript at 3–4), available at http://works.bepress.com/david_law/14 (suggesting that 
empiricists have failed meaningfully to define “ideology” for purposes of assessing appellate 
decisionmaking and proposing a new methodology for characterizing judges’ votes based on 
past voting behavior). 
 54. Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 88. 
 55. Id. at 89. 
 56. Id. at 89 n.280. 
 57. See infra notes 149–66 and accompanying text. 
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whether a particular judge, when appointed, would have been 
considered liberal.58 
However, such a study would be limited by many of the same 
methodological issues faced by other empirical analyses, and it would 
not address the extent to which appellate decisionmaking is 
influenced by extralegal factors, rather than by the law, precedent, 
and judicial deliberations.59 Ideology is a complex idea that has never, 
to our knowledge, been convincingly captured in any empirical legal 
analysis. Judge Posner argues that we should distinguish between a 
judge’s presumed political party affiliation, which he finds largely 
insignificant in assessing the effect of extralegal factors on appellate 
decisionmaking, and a judge’s “ideology”: 
The question is what determines the judge’s discretionary judgment. 
  . . . . 
  . . . “Politics” is not quite right, because it implies 
partisanship . . . . [M]ost of our judges do not identify with a political 
party . . . . “Ideology” is better. “Ideology” is a body of more or less 
coherent bedrock beliefs about social, economic, and political 
questions, or, more precisely perhaps, a worldview that shapes one’s 
answers to those questions. Our principal political parties are 
coalitions and so lack coherent ideologies. A judge may lean more 
toward the set of policies associated with the Democratic Party or 
more toward the set associated with the Republican Party, but 
neither party is ideologically consistent; that is why party affiliation 
has only limited value in predicting judicial decisions even in the 
open area.60 
Judge Posner conjectures that the principal “sources of judges’ 
ideologies” are “moral and religious values.”61 He then argues that 
these values 
 
 58. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study 
3 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 404, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1126403. 
 59. As discussed in Part I, that the party of the president and Senate at the time of a judge’s 
confirmation correlates with some measure of case outcomes does not confirm that extralegal 
factors are in fact determining those outcomes. Debates and differences of perspective fully 
within the law could equally account for such differences. 
 60. Posner, The Role of the Judge, supra note 44, at 1058–59. 
 61. Id. at 1060. 
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are a product of upbringing, education, salient life experiences, and 
personal characteristics (which may determine those experiences) 
such as race, sex, and ethnicity; and also of temperament, which 
shapes not only values but also dispositions, such as timidity and 
boldness, that influence a judge’s response to cases. At bottom, then, 
the sources of ideology are both cognitive and psychological, but I 
think the psychological dominates, because psychology exerts such a 
great influence on our interpretation of our experiences, including 
the weights assigned to the possible consequences of deciding a case 
one way or the other.62 
In addition, a richer and more accurate account would acknowledge 
that ideology is unlikely to remain fixed after early childhood, but 
would continue to respond to experience and evolve over the course 
of a person’s lifetime. 
No empirical study of which we are aware accurately measures 
the relationship between ideology, either in Judge Posner’s terms or 
another equally nuanced view, and case outcomes. As Professor Sisk 
has noted, 
[W]e should be far from satisfied with the concept of ideology as 
presently applied in empirical work regarding the courts. The 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines ideology as 
“one variant form of those comprehensive patterns of cognitive and 
moral beliefs about man, society, and the universe in relation to man 
and society, which flourish in human societies.” Nothing nearly so 
sophisticated is in operation in most empirical research conducted 
on the courts, whether undertaken by political scientists or law 
professors.63 
Nor is this problem amenable to easy solutions: 
[R]efinement of the statistical measurement of ideology [does not] 
appear likely to revolutionize the empirical research process in a 
manner that will permit more confident conclusions. The empirical 
evidence cannot justify elevating the assumed ideological or partisan 
affiliations of judges above such traditional measures of judicial 
temperament as legal experience, quality of legal reasoning, respect 
for other actors in the legal process, and integrity.64 
 
 62. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 63. Sisk, supra note 8, at 892 (footnote omitted). 
 64. Sisk & Heise, supra note 8, at 794. 
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In the final analysis, it is dangerous to assume that appointment 
variables are a useful proxy for ideology. While appointment 
variables may be easily identified, the link between those measures 
and some concept of “ideology” is contestable. When researchers 
attempt to link an appointment variable with ideology, they weaken, 
rather than strengthen, the quality of their analyses. Instead of 
theorizing about a correlation that they can show—PAP and case 
outcome, for example—they assume an identity between ideology 
and PAP and then conclude that they have shown a correlation 
between “ideology” and outcome. This connection is murky at best. 
Researchers are on much safer ground theorizing about the reasons 
for any perceived connection between PAP and outcome rather than 
assuming the connection between PAP and ideology, and then 
claiming to have shown a connection between ideology and outcome. 
C. Methodological Problems Inherent in Empirical Studies That Seek 
to Understand Judicial Decisionmaking 
Empirical studies of judicial decisionmaking face several 
important methodological hurdles as well. Before statistical 
techniques can be applied, the inputs and outputs of the judicial 
process must be translated into mathematical terms. This process 
must be carefully structured to avoid introducing errors in the 
analysis; and conclusions that are drawn necessarily must be 
circumscribed to acknowledge the simplifications inherent in coding. 
As with any other statistical analysis, close attention must be paid to 
the selection of data and the relationships between variables under 
study. While all of the difficulties of traditional data analysis are 
present, a host of additional problems arise when judicial 
decisionmaking—a fundamentally textual (and contextual) 
enterprise—is reduced to statistical information. 
1. Problems with the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Used by 
Empiricists—Coding Errors and the Total Omission of Unpublished 
Decisions.  Many empiricists rely on the “U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Database,” sometimes called the “Songer database” to provide the 
raw data for their analyses.65 The database, which codes a random 
 
 65. See The Judicial Research Initiative, Appeals Court Data, 
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appctdata.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2008). The database was 
originally compiled by Donald R. Songer and then updated by Ashlyn K. Kuersten and Susan B. 
Haire. 
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sample of published court of appeals decisions issued since 1925, was 
“designed to create an extensive dataset to facilitate the empirical 
analysis of the votes of judges and the decisions of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals.”66 Although the database is routinely used by empirical legal 
scholars, it has at least two serious flaws. 
First, as Landes and Posner discovered, the Songer database has 
significant coding mistakes that can distort the accuracy of dependent 
variables in empirical studies.67 These mistakes are explained in the 
next section. Second, the Songer database does not include 
unpublished decisions issued by the courts of appeals.68 This is an 
extremely important omission, because a huge percentage of courts of 
appeals decisions are reported but unpublished. In fact, in 2007, less 
than 17 percent of all opinions in the courts of appeals were 
published.69 Published decisions as a sample of total decisions are far 
from random: the judgments rendered in unpublished decisions are 
largely unanimous, and these cases typically involve more 
straightforward applications of law. Unpublished decisions, no less 
than published decisions, dispose of appeals on the merits. 
Importantly, unpublished decisions offer valuable information 
regarding a court’s adherence to precedent, because in these cases the 
law is often most clear. Law professors and researchers tend to focus 
on published decisions that raise difficult issues and establish new 
precedent. For the vast majority of litigants, however, it is often of no 
moment whether a case is published or not. The court’s judgment is 
what matters. And every judgment counts when one attempts to 
accurately measure the work of the appellate courts. Therefore, any 
assessment of the work of the courts of appeals that does not include 
unpublished decisions cannot be seen as complete. 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See infra text accompanying notes 74–77. 
 68. DONALD R. SONGER, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS DATA BASE 
DOCUMENTATION FOR PHASE 1, at 8 (n.d.), available at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/ 
cta_codebook.pdf. See generally Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and 
State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. APP. PRAC. 
& PROCESS 349, 351–57 tbl.1 (2004) (setting forth publication standards in different circuits). 
 69. 57,973 appeals were filed in the courts of appeals for the year ending December 31, 
2007. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY tbl.B (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/stats/dec07. During this same 
period, courts of appeals terminated 31,340 cases on the merits. Id. at tbl.B-5. Less than 17 
percent of those dispositions were published. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 48 tbl.S-3 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
judbus2007/ JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. 
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2. Problems with Dependent Variables—Trying to Code Judicial 
Decisions.  Empirical studies of judicial decisions look at “dependent” 
and “independent“ variables. Dependent variables concern the object 
under study, while the independent variables are those that are 
hypothesized to affect the dependent variable. In studies of judicial 
decisionmaking, the dependent variables relate to judicial opinions. 
Typically, the component of a judicial opinion that has been treated 
as a dependant variable is the case “outcome.” 
Coding the outcome of a case involves significant difficulties. 
Scholars have noted that there are many possible dispositions of cases 
decided by the appellate courts: 
• stay, petition, or motion granted 
• affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied 
• reversed (including reversed and vacated) 
• reversed and remanded (or just remanded) 
• vacated and remanded (also set aside and remanded; modified 
and remanded) 
• affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or affirmed 
and modified) 
• affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; affirmed in 
part, vacated in part, and remanded 
• vacated 
• petition denied or appeal dismissed 
• certification to another court70 
Empirical studies routinely collapse the dispositions into a simple 
binary outcome—such as “appellant prevails” or “appellee prevails.” 
Reducing complex case outcomes to a binary variable may lead to 
repeatability problems and create a significant source of potential 
coding errors.71 
Some studies seek to code case outcome according to topical or 
political criteria. For example, in an empirical study done by Glendon 
Schubert, Supreme Court decisions issued between 1946 and 1963 
were coded along two axes—political liberal/conservative and 
 
 70. Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 85 tbl.5 (citing The Judicial Research Initiative, supra 
note 65). 
 71. Id. (noting that a researcher seeking to replicate or update a study based on a binary 
coding system for case outcome will have to make “judgment call[s], which may or may not be 
the same one[s] [the author] made. . . . [thereby] detract[ing] from the reliability of [the] 
measure”). 
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economic liberal/conservative.72 Cases also have been coded as pro-
/antienvironment, pro-/anticriminal defendant, pro/anti-civil rights, 
and so on. Perhaps the most common metric used in empirical studies 
is a simple “left/right” or “liberal/conservative” binary.73 These topical 
or political measures used to describe cases will necessarily simplify a 
court’s holding and reduce what may be a complex and nuanced 
decision into an often uninformative binary. 
When decisions are coded as liberal or conservative, every issue 
resolved by the court in a single case must be collapsed into a single 
determination of whether the outcome falls on the left or right side of 
the binary. In other words, case outcomes normally are not measured 
to give a complete reflection of the outcome in political terms. In an 
administrative law case, for example, the court’s disposition might 
include a judgment on standing that appears to be “conservative,” a 
judgment on “arbitrary and capricious” review that appears to be 
“liberal,” and a judgment under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.74 review that is neither—this nuance 
is lost in a binary outcome characterization. 
In this same vein, it is very difficult to characterize many case 
outcomes. For example, the general rights embraced by freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression sometimes conflict with the 
exercise of other rights; it may not be clear how presumed liberal or 
conservative judges should be expected to vote in such cases. Cases 
may be disposed of on procedural grounds that are essentially 
nonideological, leading to coding errors when the outcome must be 
coded as liberal or conservative. A court’s interpretation of a statute 
may defy ideological description (e.g., rate allocations in a matter 
before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, where the parties 
before the court are competing companies). Even a cursory review of 
some of the cases listed in Appendix B, infra, shows that many 
appeals involve multiple, complex issues, thus making it impossible to 
describe the appellate court’s disposition as liberal or conservative. 
Finally, coding normally does not take into account the role of the 
 
 72. SCHUBERT, supra note 29, at 97. 
 73. See, e.g., Songer, supra note 68, at 5–6 (“[In the Songer database], the directionality of 
the court’s decision was recorded, using conventional definitions of directionality that are 
closely analogous to those in the Spaeth Supreme Court data base [sic]. For most, but not all 
issue categories, these will correspond to notions of ‘liberal’ (coded as ‘3’) and ‘conservative’ 
(coded as ‘1’) that are commonly used in the public law literature.”). 
 74. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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record on appeal, whether certain issues have been forfeited or 
waived, the role of precedent, or the effect of judicial deliberations. 
That coding is an imperfect enterprise is strikingly revealed in 
Landes and Posner’s efforts to correct the Songer courts of appeals 
database that has been used by many empirical legal scholars. In a 
“spot check of 40 cases” from the database, Landes and Posner found 
“a high error rate in cases decided before 1960.”75 They also found “a 
number of the systematic classification decisions that the coders made 
[which were] erroneous, such as classifying all votes for plaintiffs in 
intellectual-property cases as liberal.”76 While Landes and Posner 
attempted to eliminate the systematic coding errors, no attempt was 
made to “correct the misclassification of individual cases.”77 While 
this evidence is anecdotal, it shows that errors exist, and furthermore 
shows that classification decisions are not uncontroversial. In addition 
to simple mistakes—where data are incorrectly inputted—there can 
be disagreement about where certain kinds of decisions fall on the 
political spectrum. These “classification errors” will not only 
introduce random “noise” into the data, but can systematically skew 
the data and create the possibility of false correlations.78 
A final, and perhaps the most troubling, problem with coding 
decisions—and one well recognized by many scholars who undertake 
empirical legal scholarship—is that only the outcomes of decisions are 
coded, not the content. A disposition on procedural grounds against 
an environmental group is treated exactly the same as a decision on 
the merits, although the consequences can be quite different. 
Opinions that reach broad conclusions of law and include significant 
dicta are treated the same as opinions that decide cases narrowly on 
only the arguments presented. Whether an opinion hews closely to 
precedent, or decides a case on first principles, is usually ignored. 
Coding only for outcome eliminates large amounts of data and treats, 
as identical, opinions that are, in many ways, quite different.79 
A related problem is that empirical studies tend to reduce 
judicial decisionmaking to the private goal of dispute resolution in 
individual cases. But judicial decisionmaking also serves public 
 
 75. Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 3. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Shapiro, supra note 19, at 481–82 (providing in-depth analysis of coding problems 
in a widely used database of Supreme Court cases). 
 79. For an example of an attempt to add legal issues to the coding process, see id. 
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goals—indeed, that is why it is a public good—of elaborating, creating 
and changing legal norms, of providing guidance to institutional 
actors both within and outside the courts, and of establishing 
democratic habits of trust and civility.80 Writers within the field of law 
and economics certainly acknowledge these public dimensions, 
focusing on such matters as incentives, transparency, and 
accountability.81 Measures of case outcome, however, do not 
incorporate these multiple purposes, instead reducing judicial 
decisionmaking to a single datum based on whichever litigant 
prevailed.82 Empiricists who rely solely on case outcomes thus equate 
a part of judicial decisionmaking with the entirety of the enterprise. 
Some empirical legal scholars understand that their research 
must “move beyond asking which litigant prevailed in a case and now 
also ask how the advocates and the court framed the question 
presented and how the legal analysis unfolded in the opinion.”83 Law 
professors should be well positioned to develop methods for 
systematically analyzing opinions.84 But significant difficulties would 
no doubt arise if legal academics made a serious effort to “transform 
classic interpretive skills into recognizable and transferable social 
science knowledge.”85 
3. Problems with Independent Variables—The Problematic 
Absence of Data on Case Records, Applicable Law, Governing 
Precedent, and Judicial Deliberations.  In empirical studies of judicial 
decisionmaking, certain independent variables that have been 
studied—such as demographic information about the judges (e.g., 
age, race, and gender)—are published and clear. Likewise, certain 
 
 80. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984); Kenneth E. 
Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938 (1975). 
 81. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW passim (7th ed. 2007). 
 82. Cass Sunstein has written extensively on “judicial minimalism,” the theory that courts 
should address only the case at hand, hew closely to precedent, and avoid overly disruptive 
changes in the law. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-
WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 27–30 (2005). The simple measure of case outcome 
fails to distinguish between a minimalist and its opposite—clearly a distinction that Sunstein 
would find important. 
 83. Sisk, supra note 8, at 885. 
 84. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial 
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63, 64 (2008). 
 85. Id. at 121. Unlike more traditional subjects of statistical study—like physical 
phenomena—”many of the civil justice phenomena that need study are not [well] suited to 
current quantitative analytic techniques.” Deborah R. Hensler, Researching Civil Justice: 
Problems and Pitfalls, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 63 (Summer 1988). 
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data emanating from outside the courtroom, like the political party in 
control of Congress at the time of decision, can also be conclusively 
established. Characteristics of the president and Congress at the time 
of a judge’s nomination and appointment are also known, and can be 
easily coded as an independent variable. 
However, the most important variables for appellate 
decisionmaking—the record before the court, the applicable law, 
governing precedent, and judicial deliberations—pose very large 
coding difficulties, and have gone largely unstudied as a result. For 
example, the task of truly “coding” precedent would be enormous. 
Formalized and repeatable procedures would have to be developed 
for identifying the legal issues present in a case, determining the 
scope of authoritative and persuasive law, and characterizing the 
effect of that law on the outcome of the case. This process—the heart 
of legal reasoning—involves an extraordinarily complex set of 
analytical skills. Breaking all of this down into a routine that could be 
done on a rote basis would be extremely difficult. An empirical legal 
scholar would also be required to decide how far afield to look for 
precedent, whether an argument by analogy is appropriate, and how 
to account for the normative weight and persuasive authority of past 
cases. Given these issues and the limitations of even foreseeable 
computing, it seems likely that directly coding “precedent” as an 
independent variable will remain extraordinarily difficult, if not 
impossible, for a long time. 
A small number of empirical legal studies have attempted to 
develop some method for examining the role of precedent, but the 
task is daunting. Lindquist and Cross constructed a study to test 
whether judges’ ideological preferences are given freer rein in cases 
of first impression, where there is no controlling precedent. They used 
lawyers’ descriptions and assessments of judges in the Almanac of the 
Federal Judiciary, supplemented by characteristics of the appointing 
president, for the “ideology” variable, and selected cases from several 
circuits where either the majority or the dissent “expressly noted that 
the case raised an issue of first impression.”86 Lindquist and Cross 
then conducted logistic regression analysis and found that “judicial 
ideology is stronger in cases of first impression.”87 Putting aside the 
question of whether the nonrandom sample of assessments offered by 
 
 86. Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel 
Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1180–81 (2005). 
 87. Id. at 1184. 
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lawyers who respond to queries from the almanac are a suitable 
measure of judicial “ideology,” and the authors’ inability to account 
for judicial deliberations, the Lindquist and Cross study suggests that 
cases of first impression are different in some measurable way from 
cases with relatively clear precedent.88 Cross has also published two 
analyses that are meant to test the effect of law on judicial 
decisionmaking. He analyzed whether courts show affirmance 
deference—i.e., whether courts tend to affirm lower court decisions—
and found that affirmance deference is a powerful predictor of 
appellate decisionmaking.89 Cross also found that in cases involving a 
controlling legal threshold, such as jurisdiction or standing, those 
thresholds “appear to exercise some classical legal tug.”90 In each 
instance, the Cross studies suggest that law influences appellate 
decisionmaking. 
Because many of the factors that contribute to judicial 
decisionmaking are either inaccessible, such as judicial deliberations, 
or extremely difficult to measure, such as precedent and the myriad 
personal beliefs and values that make up a judge’s “ideology,” 
empirical studies tend to focus on factors that are more amenable to 
empirical study—such as party of appointing president—even if those 
factors ultimately have little explanatory power. The real problem 
here is not that scholars focus on variables that are more easily 
measured, but that some empirical studies exaggerate their 
conclusions and leave readers with the impression that there is strong 
evidence showing a powerful across-the-board relationship between 
the party of appointing president and appellate decisionmaking.91 
And from this, readers are sometimes led to believe that appellate 
decisionmaking is largely influenced by the judges’ personal 
ideological preferences. Readers often may not understand the 
coding problems inherent in many empirical studies, the problems 
underlying proxies for ideology, and the differences between moral 
 
 88. In another part of the study, Lindquist and Cross found that, in the context of 
interpreting the phrase “under color of” state law from 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the power of precedent 
to reduce the predictive power of the almanac variable does not uniformly increase over time. 
Id. at 1198–200. 
 89. CROSS, supra note 5, at 54. 
 90. Id. at 200. 
 91. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 150 (2006) (“The most difficult issues are resolved, 
[and] the principal empirical findings are clear. In many domains, Republican appointees vote 
very differently from Democratic appointees, and ideological tendencies are both dampened 
and amplified by the composition of the panel.”). 
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and political judgment legitimately exercised in interpreting the law 
and extralegal preferences. Nor may they appreciate the 
consequences of not including unpublished decisions and not 
accounting for case records, the application of law, the effect of 
precedent, and the impact of judicial deliberations. For these reasons, 
empirical studies should carefully and fully reveal their limitations 
and state their conclusions with caution. 
II.  RECENT EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF DECISIONMAKING IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 
Legal scholars applying social science methodologies to the 
examination of the federal appellate courts have analyzed the effect 
of appointment variables on case outcomes in many areas, including 
review of environmental regulation,92 and application of the Chevron 
doctrine,93 as well as the propensity to dissent.94 Studies also have 
looked at the influence of Congress on judicial decisions95 and the 
contribution of visiting judges.96 Together, these and other studies 
have contributed to “a flowering of ‘large-scale quantitative studies of 
facts and outcome[s]’”97 that have ultimately led to “an effort to 
understand the sources of judicial decisions on the basis of testable 
hypotheses and large data sets.”98 Professor Gregory Sisk has 
characterized the growth of empirical legal studies as a “‘Quantitative 
Moment’ in the legal academy.”99 
We examine three relatively recent contributions to this 
“Quantitative Moment”: Frank B. Cross’s Decision Making in the 
 
 92. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 8 passim; Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note 8 
passim. 
 93. See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 8 passim; Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: 
An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 
1, 38–39 (1998); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 
1741, 1758–63 (1999) (correlating appointment variables and outcomes in standing cases). 
 94. See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, 
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 
passim (2006). 
 95. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 52 passim. 
 96. See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh, The Contribution of “Extra” Judges, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 301 
passim (2006). 
 97. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 
831 (2008) (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1244 (1931)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Sisk, supra note 8, at 876. 
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U.S. Courts of Appeals (“Cross”),100 Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, 
Lisa M. Ellman, and Andres Sawicki’s Are Judges Political?: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (“Sunstein”),101 and 
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner’s, Rational Judicial 
Behavior: A Statistical Study (“Landes and Posner”).102 All three 
studies focus solely on “published” opinions and do not attempt to 
calculate the outcomes reached in the huge mass of “unpublished” 
court of appeals decisions.103 As with many of their peers, these 
scholars focus mostly on characteristics of judges, such as party of 
appointing president, and attempt to draw “causal inferences about 
the effect of judicial characteristics on outcomes.”104 
In order to draw these inferences, standard statistical techniques 
are used to varying degrees in each of the studies. The results of these 
three analyses are consistent with other empirical studies that have 
looked at a broad cross section of cases, in that they do not 
“demonstrate that any extralegal factor—ideology, judicial 
background, strategic reaction to other institutions, the nature of 
litigants, or the makeup of appellate panels—explains more than a 
very small part of the variation in outcomes.”105 
A. A Look at Sunstein, Are Judges Political? 
Sunstein has described federal appellate decisions as “an 
extraordinary and longstanding natural experiment . . . involv[ing] the 
relationship between presidential choices and judicial decisions.”106 
The “presidential choices” to which Sunstein refers are the choices 
that presidents have made in selecting their judicial nominees. The 
purpose of Sunstein’s study is to determine “how Republican and 
Democratic appointees differ from one another.”107 
The Sunstein study proposes three hypotheses. Sunstein’s first 
hypothesis, “ideological voting,” posits that “a judge’s ideological 
 
 100. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007). 
 101. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91. 
 102. Landes & Posner, supra note 58. 
 103. CROSS, supra note 5, at 3 (noting the use of two databases of published opinions); 
Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 2 (same); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 97, at 18 (“Most of 
the relevant studies are limited to published judicial opinions.”). 
 104. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 97, at 835. 
 105. Sisk, supra note 8, at 877. 
 106. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91, at 4. 
 107. Id. 
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tendency can be predicted by the party of the appointing president.”108 
In his formulation, the phrase “ideological tendency” means the 
tendency of a judge to “vote” in a stereotypically conservative or 
liberal fashion—where a judge “votes” for a case outcome by joining 
the majority and “votes” against the outcome by authoring or joining 
a dissent.109 This hypothesis is tested by using the party of the 
president that appointed a judge (“party of appointing President” or 
PAP)110 as an independent variable, and the judge’s vote—classified 
by Sunstein as either “liberal” or “conservative”—as the dependent 
variable.111 
The second Sunstein hypothesis, “ideological dampening,” posits 
that a judge sitting on a “mixed panel”—that is, sitting with two 
judges appointed by presidents of the other party—will be less likely 
to vote according to his or her own ideological preferences.112 Sunstein 
uses PAP as a proxy for the judge’s ideological leanings to test this 
hypothesis and seeks to determine if sitting on a mixed panel reduces 
the predictive power of PAP for a judge’s vote.113 
The final hypothesis, “ideological amplification,” posits that 
when all of the judges on a panel share ideology, they will be more 
likely to vote in a stereotypical fashion.114 To test this hypothesis, 
Sunstein again uses PAP as a proxy for ideology and seeks to 
determine if PAP is a stronger predictor of a judge’s voting when that 
judge sits on a nonmixed panel—that is, one comprised entirely of 
judges appointed by presidents of the same party.115 
To test these hypotheses, Sunstein selected 6,408 published 
three-judge panel decisions in several relatively high profile and 
politically charged areas of law, including abortion, affirmative action, 
and challenges to environmental regulation.116 These cases and nearly 
20,000 associated individual votes were compiled using a series of 
relatively straightforward Lexis searches.117 Each case and vote was 
 
 108. Id. at 8. 
 109. Id. at 19. 
 110. Id. at 6, 153 nn.4–7 (noting that the party of the appointing president is a “crude” proxy 
for judicial ideology). 
 111. Id. at 163. 
 112. Id. at 8–9. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 117. 
 117. Id. at 157–63 nn.2–25. 
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then coded as “liberal” or “conservative,” based on the outcome. For 
example, in cases involving challenges to environmental regulations, 
“[a] vote counted as liberal if it favored upholding an agency’s 
decision that was against industry attack, or if it favored striking down 
an agency’s decision in the face of a challenge by a public interest 
group.”118 The choice between liberal or conservative was binary: 
there was no scale; the coding was determined purely by the outcome, 
and no account was taken of the reasoning supporting a decision or 
the effect of governing precedent.119 
Sunstein then compared the judges’ votes with the party of 
appointing presidents. The votes of “Democratic” judges and 
“Republican” judges (based on PAP) were compared for each of the 
types of cases examined.120 This analysis found differences in voting 
patterns in some substantive areas, but not others. The largest 
difference was found in the area of gay and lesbian rights, where 
Democratic-PAP judges voted for the plaintiff in 57 percent of cases, 
but Republican-PAP judges voted for the plaintiff in only 16 percent 
of cases.121 Other areas with relatively large differences included 
capital punishment cases, labor cases, and sex discrimination cases.122 
There were several areas where there was little or no difference in 
voting between Republican-PAP and Democratic-PAP judges, 
including criminal appeals, takings cases, and punitive damages 
cases.123 
To test the second hypothesis, ideological dampening, Sunstein 
sought to identify the effects of other panel members’ ideological 
preferences on a judge’s vote.124 PAP is used as a proxy for ideology, 
and judges are classified according to the presumed political 
affiliation of their panel colleagues into three categories—both 
Democratic PAP, one Democratic PAP and one Republican PAP, 
and both Republican PAP.125 Here, the authors again found variation 
by subject matter. In gay and lesbian cases, where the other two 
judges on a panel were both Republican PAP, the third judge voted 
in favor of expanding or protecting gay and lesbian rights only 27 
 
 118. Id. at 161 n.20. 
 119. Id. at 19. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 20–21 tbl.2-1. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 22. 
 125. Id. at 23, 163 n.30. 
EDWARDS IN FINAL.DOC 5/25/2009  4:05:32 PM 
1934 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1895 
percent of the time.126 In contrast, when the other two judges were 
Democratic PAP, the third judge voted in favor of expanding or 
protecting rights 60 percent of the time.127 Other issue areas—for 
example, abortion and capital punishment cases—showed no such 
effects. 128 
To test the ideological amplification hypothesis, Sunstein 
compared mixed panels with nonmixed panels.129 Again, some issue 
areas showed greater differences than others. For example, in cases 
involving the National Environmental Policy Act, panels consisting of 
three Democratic-PAP judges favored an expanded view of the act 71 
percent of the time, while panels with two Democratic-PAP judges 
and one Republican-PAP judge favored an expanded view of the act 
42 percent of the time.130 Sunstein also reports that in deciding cases 
governed by Chevron,131 D.C. Circuit panels made up entirely of 
Republican-PAP judges invalidated agency action “when expected to 
do so on political grounds” 67 percent of the time, while panels with 
two Republican-PAP judges and one Democratic-PAP judge did so in 
38 percent of cases.132 
Sunstein claims that, in several issue areas, all three 
hypotheses—i.e., that judges vote ideologically, that mixed panels 
dampen ideological effects, and that nonmixed panels amplify 
ideological effects—were confirmed.133 These areas included 
affirmative action cases, labor cases, cases brought under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, cases brought under the National 
Environmental Policy Act, desegregation cases, and campaign finance 
cases.134 There were five areas where all of the hypotheses were 
rebutted: criminal appeals, federalism cases, takings cases, cases 
involving punitive damages, and standing cases. In these latter areas, 
Sunstein concluded that “there is no significant difference between 
the votes of Republican appointees and those of Democratic 
appointees.”135 Finally, in abortion and capital punishment cases, 
 
 126. Id. at 20–21 tbl.2-1. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 25. 
 130. Id. at 20–21 tbl.2-1. 
 131. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 132. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91, at 80. 
 133. Id. at 24. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 48. 
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panel effects were not found—the votes of judges were unaffected by 
panel composition.136 
The Sunstein authors conclude that there is “considerable 
evidence” confirming that “[f]requently the law is clear” and 
appellate judges “simply implement it, no matter who has appointed 
them.”137 They claim, however, that, while the results of their study 
may leave some questions open, “the most difficult issues are 
resolved,” and “the principal empirical findings are clear.”138 “In many 
domains,” according to the Sunstein authors, “Republican appointees 
vote very differently from Democratic appointees, and ideological 
tendencies are both dampened and amplified by the composition of 
the panel.”139 The authors thus believe their findings justify specific 
policy proposals geared towards encouraging the diversity of 
ideological viewpoints on the federal judiciary. Although they “are 
not prepared to suggest a formal requirement that federal tribunals 
should be balanced along party lines,”140 they conclude that, “in the 
abstract, a mix is much better than uniformity,”141 and that “the 
evidence outlined [in the book] can easily be taken to support the 
view that the Senate has a responsibility to . . . ensure a reasonable 
diversity of views.”142 
B. A Look at Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
The Cross analysis differs from Sunstein’s in several key respects. 
Rather than limiting the sample to particular issue areas, or 
attempting to code case outcome himself, Cross “draw[s] heavily on 
large, publicly available data sets,”143 especially the United States 
Courts of Appeals Database and the Database on the Attributes of 
the United States Appeals Courts Judges, supplemented by other 
sources. The courts of appeals database (discussed in Part I.C.1 
supra) includes several thousand cases—at least fifteen cases per 
circuit starting in 1925.144 The cases have been coded for “numerous 
variables,” including “the ideological direction of the decisional 
 
 136. Id. at 54–57. 
 137. Id. at 5. 
 138. Id. at 150. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 138. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 141–42. 
 143. CROSS, supra note 5, at 3. 
 144. Id. 
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outcome (whether liberal or conservative) . . . the type of case being 
decided . . . and some of the legal issues presented in the case.”145 The 
database of attributes provides information on factors such “as race, 
gender, religion [and] the identity of the appointing president.”146 
Cross uses these databases and runs a large number of logistic 
regression analyses to test a variety of hypotheses.147 
Several chapters of Cross’ study are devoted to the impact of 
ideology on judicial decisionmaking. In contrast to the Sunstein study, 
which uses PAP as a proxy for ideology, Cross’ “Ideology” variable is 
based on a measure created by Michael Giles of Emory University, 
which accounts for both the ideological preferences of appointing 
presidents and the preferences of “the senators who are typically 
consulted” during the judicial appointment process.148 As in the 
Sunstein study, the coding of cases as liberal or conservative, part of 
the courts of appeals database, is binary. Cross acknowledges that 
[t]he available methods for measuring the ideology of judges and 
decisions are rough and imperfect. Translating something so 
amorphous as ideology into a numerical measure for quantitative 
analysis will inevitably be imperfect.149 
Using Giles scores as the independent variable and 
conservative/liberal outcome as the dependant variable in a logistic 
regression, Cross finds a statistically significant relationship150 that he 
interprets to mean that “a unitary change in the judicial ideology 
measure [from most conservative to most liberal] will produce a 6% 
change in associated ideological decisions.”151 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Sunstein also uses logistic regression to determine statistical significance. See SUNSTEIN 
ET AL., supra note 91, at 163 n.30. However, the main analyses that Sunstein reports are not 
based on logistic regressions. Many people are familiar with ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression, where a line of “best-fit” is developed for a given data set. Logistic regression is a 
form of regression used when the dependent variable is binary. While logistic regression differs 
in important ways from OLS regression, the idea is similar and each technique attempts to 
model the relationship between variables. 
 148. CROSS, supra note 5, at 19. 
 149. Id. at 20. 
 150. Cross found a logit coefficient of .061. Id. at 24. 
 151. Id. This finding is based on the coefficient of .061. A logit coefficient must be 
interpreted with care. Unlike in the case of ordinary least square regressions, the slope 
coefficient in a logistic regression is not (an estimation of) the rate of change in the dependent 
variable as the independent variable changes. Rather, the slope coefficient is the rate of change 
in the log odds as the independent variable changes. FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION: 
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Cross also divides the cases into the following case categories: 
criminal, civil rights, First Amendment, privacy, labor relations, 
economic, and miscellaneous.152 Cross finds no statistically significant 
relationship between Giles scores and outcome in the First 
Amendment, privacy, and miscellaneous categories.153 The 
relationship between Giles scores and outcome is strongest in due 
process cases, with a relatively strong relationship in labor relations 
cases as well.154 Cross then divides the cases into a different set of 
categories: constitutional cases, cases interpreting a federal statute, 
cases where an amicus curiae filed a brief, class actions, criminal 
procedure cases, and diversity cases.155 Again, there are differences. 
This time, the strongest relationships are found in cases in which 
amici are present, in criminal procedure cases, and in cases in which a 
federal statute is in play. 
Cross additionally attempts to examine the role of deference to 
lower courts in appellate decisionmaking. To do this, he creates a new 
independent variable by assigning the lower court decision an 
ideological label based on case outcome.156 His regression using the 
ideological direction of the lower court decision and Giles scores 
found that both Giles scores and the new variable have statistically 
significant relationships with case outcomes.157 
Cross also examines panel effects. In the first panel analysis, 
Cross looks at the effect on a judge’s vote of “the total ideological 
[i.e., Giles] score of the other judges on the panel.”158 He finds that 
this variable has a stronger relationship to the judge’s vote than the 
judge’s own Giles score.159 Cross describes these results as 
 
A PRIMER 18–39 (2000). Where logistic regression is used only for the purposes of computing 
statistical significance (as in Sunstein’s work), the interpretation of the logit coefficient does not 
pose a problem. However, where conclusions are drawn directly from the logit coefficients, 
there must be adequate explanation of how those conclusions follow. 
 152. CROSS, supra note 5, at 27 tbl.1.3. 
 153. Id. at 27. 
 154. Id. at tbl.1.3. 
 155. Id. at 28 tbl.1.4. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 54 tbl.2.2. The logit coefficients were .040 for Giles score and .149 for the new 
lower court variable—indicating that the later variable had more explanatory power. Id. 
 158. Id. at 165. 
 159. Id. at 165 tbl.6.2. The Giles scores of the other judges (referred to by Cross as 
“OtherIdeology”) had a coefficient of .086 and a p-score of .000, while the Giles score of the 
judge in question had a coefficient of .020 and a p-score of .106. Id. 
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“appear[ing] to show distinct panel effects.”160 Cross then attempts to 
test the “median voter” theory, i.e., the idea that the views of the 
median panel voter will carry the day. With the median Giles score 
and the total Giles score as independent variables and case outcome 
as the dependent variable, Cross finds that the median Giles score 
was not statistically significant but that the total Giles score was a 
statistically significant predictor.161 Cross interprets the data to mean 
that “[t]he median voter theorem appears entirely inapplicable to 
circuit court panels.”162 Cross views these analyses as “striking in their 
demonstration of panel effects.”163 
Cross examines several other variables, including other 
background characteristics of judges, such as the race, gender, and 
past employment; the “ideological preferences of the Supreme 
Court,” as measured by Segal-Cover scores;164 various measures of the 
“preferences of the legislature” at the time of decision; and the types 
of litigants before the court. Cross finds these variables to have either 
no statistically significant relationship or weak relationships to 
outcomes. 
Cross concludes that, while appointment variables had 
measurable effects, they had “very limited . . . explanatory power,” 
especially when compared to legal variables for which “there was 
consistently a statistically significant association that was robust to 
different samples and control variables.”165 Among the important 
legal variables studied was deference to lower court decisions, which 
was “by far the most important single variable substantively in 
explaining circuit court outcomes.”166 Cross also suggests that, on 
 
 160. Id. at 165. 
 161. Id. at 166 tbl.6.3. The median Giles score (referred to by Cross as “MedianIdeology”) 
had a coefficient of .04 and a p-score of .816. The total Giles score (referred to by Cross as 
“TotalIdeology”) had a coefficient of .087 and a p-score of .003. Id. 
 162. Id. at 166. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 103. Segal-Cover scores were developed by Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover 
and attempt to identify ideological leanings of Supreme Court Justices using newspaper articles 
about the Justice prior to confirmation. See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, 
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 
(1989) (using content-analytic techniques to create a predictive attitudinal model for judges’ 
voting). 
 165. CROSS, supra note 5, at 229. 
 166. Id. at 228. 
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mixed panels, the use of “nonideological law [can be] a persuasive 
argument that overcomes ideological preferences.”167 
C. A Look at Landes and Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior 
Landes and Posner take a similar approach in a recent study that 
looks at both Supreme Court and appellate court decisions. They 
propose an informal model of a “rational-choice (economic) 
approach to judicial behavior.”168 Landes and Posner assume that, 
because federal judges have life tenure, external motivations such as 
fear of firing or hope of promotion are largely irrelevant. Rather, they 
“expect that leisure” would be a major judicial motivation as well as 
“self-expression, for example of political preferences,” and “esteem 
(prestige, reputation, etc.).”169 
Based on this model, Landes and Posner conduct an analysis of 
the same database used in the Cross study, but only after making 
some corrections for the coding errors discussed in Part I.C.2 supra. 
Like Sunstein and Cross, Landes and Posner examine the relationship 
between political factors and judicial votes. The political variables in 
the Landes and Posner study are “party of appointing President,” as 
well as the composition of the Senate at the time of a judge’s 
appointment. The Landes and Posner analysis shows a statistically 
significant relationship between PAP and the percentage of judges’ 
votes that were conservative or liberal. However, these relationships, 
while statistically significant, were not very powerful.170 Landes and 
Posner also found that the partisan composition of the Senate had a 
statistically significant relationship with the fraction of judges’ votes 
that were conservative or liberal in civil, but not in criminal, cases.171 
Gender and race were not found to be significant predictors of 
judges’ votes. 
Landes and Posner, like Sunstein and Cross, are interested in the 
group dynamics on the bench as well. Landes and Posner, however, 
take a different approach from Sunstein and Cross. Rather than 
 
 167. Id. at 168. 
 168. Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 4. 
 169. Id. at 5. 
 170. Id. at 56 tbl.12. In Landes and Posner’s analysis, whether PAP was Republican was the 
independent variable. The coefficient for fraction conservative in civil cases was .023; the 
coefficient for fraction liberal in civil cases was -.028; the coefficient for fraction conservative in 
criminal cases was .059; the coefficient for fraction liberal in criminal cases was -.051. Id. 
 171. See id. (noting that the coefficients were .192 for fraction conservative, and -.193 for 
fraction liberal in civil cases). 
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looking at particular panel compositions, Landes and Posner look to 
the fraction of judges on a circuit appointed by a given party. They 
test three hypotheses: the “conformity hypothesis,” the “group-
polarization hypothesis,” and the “political-polarization effect.”172 The 
first hypothesis is that an increase in the number of Republicans on a 
circuit “will increase the likelihood that any judge in the circuit will 
cast a conservative vote.”173 The second is that “judges appointed by 
Republican Presidents will vote more conservatively in response to an 
increase in the fraction of the judges on their court appointed by 
Republican Presidents[,] but that judges appointed by Democratic 
Presidents will not.”174 The final hypothesis is that “an increase in the 
size of one of the blocs relative to another will cause the second to 
vote more antagonistically to the first.”175 
Landes and Posner found that the conformity hypothesis was 
supported by their analysis. In a multivariable regression that 
accounted for PAP as well as other variables, the fraction of 
Republicans in a circuit was significantly correlated with the fraction 
of conservative votes, with a coefficient of .221—much larger than the 
.092 coefficient for PAP in that regression. Landes and Posner 
interpret that to mean that if, “in a circuit that has 6 judges appointed 
by Republican Presidents and 6 appointed by Democratic Presidents, 
one of the judges that had been appointed by a Democratic President 
is replaced by a judge appointed by a Republican President,” then 
“[t]he mean value of the fraction of conservative votes in civil cases 
for the average judge will increase from .52 to .54” and in criminal 
cases “from .74 to .78.”176 
There was “some evidence of group polarization” such that “the 
in-group becomes more extreme.”177 The political-polarization 
hypothesis, which postulates that the minority becomes more 
antagonistic to the majority the fewer its members, was not 
supported. Based on these findings, Landes and Posner concluded 
that there was 
a triple effect of a change in the ideological composition of a court 
when a member of the [Democratic] minority bloc on the court . . . is 
 
 172. Id. at 30. 
 173. Id. at 32. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 33. 
 177. Id. at 33, 34. 
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replaced by a member of the [Republican] majority bloc: The 
majority becomes larger and therefore the court becomes more 
conservative irrespective of any group effects; the members of the 
majority become more conservative than they were when there were 
fewer of them; and the minority becomes more docile.178 
Landes and Posner also offer a “possible economic explanation” 
for the conformity effect in the appellate courts, which they did not 
find in the Supreme Court. 
The workload of the courts of appeals is heavier than that of the 
Supreme Court . . . . Especially given leisure preference, the heavier 
workload in the courts of appeals makes the cost of a dissent 
greater . . . . The heavier workload also increases the benefits of 
decision according to precedent, which greatly reduces the time and 
effort involved in a decision; instead of having to analyze the case 
from the ground up, the court looks for a very similar previous case 
and decides the new case the same way.179 
According to Landes and Posner, due to heavy workloads in the 
courts of appeals, appellate judges have little incentive to dissent, 
knowing that the majority opinion will be followed and the dissent 
will be ignored in future cases.  
III.  WHY EMPIRICAL STUDIES DO NOT TELL US  
VERY MUCH ABOUT APPELLATE DECISIONMAKING 
A. Our Assessment of Empirical Legal Studies That Attempt to 
Understand Extralegal Factors Affecting Appellate 
Decisionmaking 
The Cross, Landes and Posner, and Sunstein studies represent 
some of the most recent, large-scale efforts to apply empirical 
methodology to the study of judicial decisionmaking in the federal 
courts of appeals. It is fair to ask whether, given their conceptual and 
methodological limitations, these studies tell us anything new, 
interesting, or useful about judicial decisionmaking. One noteworthy 
finding of these projects is that, even on their own limited terms, the 
studies do not show that a substantial percentage of published federal 
appellate cases are decided on political or ideological grounds (as 
crudely defined). In other words—and again on their own terms—
 
 178. Id. at 34. 
 179. Id. at 34–35. 
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empirical studies predict very little about the effects of extralegal 
factors on appellate decisionmaking. And, unsurprisingly, the studies 
do not refute the claim that case records, the applicable law, 
controlling precedent, and judicial deliberations are critically 
important determinants of appellate decisionmaking. 
Because the Cross and Landes and Posner studies looked at a 
random sample of cases (putting aside the absence of any data on 
“unpublished decisions—an important caveat), those studies provide 
the more meaningful bases from which to draw general conclusions 
about the judiciary. Perhaps most striking is the degree to which the 
party of appointing president and the Giles scores were not found 
predictive of appellate court decisions. Cross found that nonlegal 
variables, such as party affiliation, had, in general, “very limited . . . 
explanatory power.”180 In Landes and Posner’s regressions, while the 
party of appointing president was a statistically significant variable, it 
was not strongly predictive of the fraction of conservative or liberal 
votes of appellate judges. As Cross explains,181 statistical significance 
in studies with large data sets does not alone imply a strong 
relationship—it simply means that the presumed relationship is 
unlikely to be one that resulted from chance, and therefore the 
relationship is probably genuine, whether strong or weak. The 
hypothesis that law substantially influences outcomes in most cases 
certainly has not been disproved by the analyses offered in the Cross 
and Landes and Posner studies. 
The Sunstein study principally focuses on substantive areas of 
the law in which the authors expected to find the largest effect from 
ideology. They found that the party of appointing president had 
statistically significant relationships with judicial decisions within 
some, but not all, of the substantive areas that they studied. The 
Sunstein study thus suggests some areas of law in which the party of 
appointing president may have more of a relationship to case 
outcomes than others. However, the Sunstein study also expresses the 
view that “[f]requently the law is clear, and judges should and will 
simply implement it, no matter who has appointed them.”182 The data 
in their study do not in any way refute this view. 
The studies on “panel effects”—that is, the effects that judges 
have on one another in appellate decisionmaking—tend to confirm 
 
 180. CROSS, supra note 5, at 229. 
 181. Id. at 4–5. 
 182. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91, at 5. 
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the widely shared understanding that judges are influenced by each 
other. Neither Cross, Landes and Posner, nor Sunstein investigated 
whether these panel effects are the result of genuine judicial 
deliberations or “strategic voting” on the part of judges. Any 
conclusion that judges’ behavior is dominated by the latter has not 
been shown. 
The answer to the question of whether politics or ideology plays 
a role in judicial decisionmaking is most significant in the normative 
sense—that is, does politics or ideology play an inappropriate role in 
judicial decisionmaking? Given that we would want and expect some 
aspects of “ideology” to bear on judicial decisionmaking—for 
example, in situations in which ideological or political questions are 
intrinsic to law—the mere fact that ideology plays some role is hardly 
cause for concern. Even where appointment variables have 
statistically significant relationships to case outcomes, the existence of 
a relationship (especially a weak one) is only troubling for someone 
who believes that, during the appointment process, it is inappropriate 
for presidents and senators to take into account judicial 
characteristics that may potentially bear on the moral and political 
questions that appropriately arise in legal disputes or are intrinsic to 
law itself. It surely does not indicate that, once confirmed, judges act 
inappropriately or place their personal leanings over respect for their 
understanding of governing law and precedent. Judges have 
maintained for decades that “they follow the law in the substantial 
proportion of the cases where the legal result is clear [and] in the 
remaining cases they do the best they can to arrive at the strongest 
legal answer.”183 The simple point here is that appointment variables 
manifestly cannot show that judges are abusing their roles on the 
bench by forwarding their personal preferences at the expense of 
governing law or abusing their legitimate discretion. 
When thinking about these matters, it is important to recall that, 
in their “published” opinions, federal appellate judges routinely 
render unanimous decisions about 90 percent of the time.184 The rate 
of dissents is much lower when “unpublished” decisions—which in 
2007 constituted over 80 percent of the cases decided by the appellate 
 
 183. Tamanaha, supra note 46 (manuscript at 11). 
 184. Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A 
Meta-analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 237 (1999). Administrative Office of the Courts data on the 
D.C. Circuit show that dissent rates hover from below 5 percent to 10 percent of cases for which 
opinions were written. When all dispositions (including unreported judgments) are taken into 
account, the dissent rate is even lower. 
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courts185—are counted.186 In other words, judicial deliberations 
produce agreement in the vast majority of cases decided in the federal 
courts of appeals. This is an impressive feat, given the complex set of 
laws that must be interpreted by the judiciary and the fact that judges 
are required to exercise discretion in a number of cases. “No more 
could be asked or expected of a rule of law system manned by human 
judges.”187 
If politics and partisan ideological gamesmanship ruled the day 
on the federal bench, the high level of consensus would almost 
certainly fall. It is no answer to suggest that judges often vote to join 
opinions to avoid the cost of dissent. Indeed, this argument borders 
on absurd. A judge is not appreciably burdened if she or he decides to 
dissent, for all the judge need do is say, “I dissent.” Even if a judge 
elects to write an opinion in dissent, no undue effort is involved once 
the judge has read the parties’ briefs, heard oral argument, engaged in 
deliberations with the other judges on the panel, and read the 
majority opinion. The simple point here is that the lack of dissenting 
opinions shows that judges appointed by both Democrats and 
Republicans usually can, and do, agree on the requirements of the 
law, without regard to their political and ideological leanings. And the 
low rate of dissents indicates a commitment by appellate judges to 
follow their shared understanding of governing precedent. This is not 
surprising. The individuals who make up the federal appellate bench 
are, by and large, a highly dedicated and committed group. Most 
members of the bench care about the law, about acting responsibly 
towards the litigants before them, and about discharging their duty to 
the American people according to the highest professional standards. 
B. Response to Potential Critiques of Our Assessment of Empirical 
Legal Studies 
There are two areas of disagreement that might arise with 
respect to our analysis of empirical legal studies. We address these 
matters in turn. 
1. Crude Proxies and the Unsophisticated Separation of Law and 
Values.  We have argued that a number of empirical legal studies are 
deficient because of the crudeness of the measures used to assess 
 
 185. See supra note 69. 
 186. Judges rarely dissent in “unpublished” decisions. 
 187. Tamanaha, supra note 46 (manuscript at 12). 
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judicial “ideology.” In particular, the use of the party of a judge’s 
appointing president is an attenuated and flattened-out 
representation of a judge’s ideology; and the characterization of case 
outcomes as “liberal” or “conservative” is maddeningly simplistic 
(both because of the assumption it makes about the straightforward 
ideological valence of results and because of the disregard it shows 
for dispositions that are more subtle than “affirm” and “reverse”). 
There are two potential responses to our critique, both of which 
fail. First, it might be argued that the crudeness of an independent 
variable generates noisy—rather than invalid—results. It is often the 
case in empirical studies involving correlational analyses that 
researchers do not have direct access to the phenomena they want to 
measure and must therefore resort to proxies. Proxies are in their 
nature imperfect representations of those phenomena. But so long as 
there is a general correlation between the proxy and the underlying 
phenomenon (and in particular, so long as the proxy is not correlated 
significantly with the absence of that phenomenon), the imperfections 
merely burden the estimates with a degree of randomness or noise 
that actually reduces the likelihood of detecting real and significant 
effects. If the researcher finds significant effects notwithstanding the 
admitted noisiness of such measures, there is reason to believe that 
there are significant correlations between the true phenomena the 
proxies represent. Second, some empirical scholars might simply 
demur, arguing that PAP should not be treated as anything other than 
PAP, and that outcome labels should not be seen as anything more 
than labels attached to outcomes. These empirical scholars will then 
say that, on this view of their work, there is still a significant 
relationship between PAP and case outcomes, and that the 
correlation cannot be connected to anything intrinsic to legal 
reasoning. 
Neither of the foregoing claims holds up under close scrutiny. 
The crudeness of the measures used to support the ideology thesis 
rest on an implausibly formalistic and positivistic conception of law. 
The hypothesis that judicial decisionmaking is influenced by the 
ideology of judges is remarkable only if and to the extent that ideology 
is extrinsic to law. If we do not subscribe to this assumption, then both 
law and ideology can influence outcomes, and greater contributions 
from the later tell us nothing about the contribution of the former. 
The crude measure of “ideology” fails to discriminate between forms 
of moral/political reasoning intrinsic to law and those extrinsic to law. 
It is well understood that legal reasoning partakes of moral judgment 
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in cases in which judges routinely exercise delegated or common law–
making authority. This need not, and generally does not, take the 
form of personal whim or preference. Rather, in cases where the law 
requires it, judicial decisionmaking can include a situated and 
disciplined elaboration of the conventional norms of the American 
political community. This occurs in both “hard” and “very hard” 
cases, including, for example, cases involving judicial resolutions of 
disputes in areas of law ranging from constitutional interpretation to 
the administration of the antitrust laws. This reality might be 
contested by some, but it is far and away the dominant understanding 
of how adjudication works in our judicial system.188 
On this account, some play for inherently contestable political 
judgments is simply built into law and strikes us as a normal 
constituent of good judging. It is obvious—to the point of being 
mundane—to suggest that there is a correlation between how 
individual judges will carry out this aspect of judicial reasoning and 
their “ideologies.” When positive law is imprecise and judges are 
required to exercise delegated or common law–making authority in 
hard or very hard cases, they often are obliged to refer to the 
conception of our community’s political morality that strikes them as 
the most compelling. Good examples of this are seen in the political 
(Meiklejohnian) conception of free speech that animated the 
Supreme Court’s seminal decision New York Times v. Sullivan,189 in 
the neoclassical conception of economics that triumphed with the 
Borkian “public welfare” understanding of antitrust law,190 and in the 
 
 188. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 130–50 (1986). Compare Japan Whaling 
Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 229–30 (1986) (“[N]ot every matter touching on 
politics is a political question, and . . . it is ‘error to suppose that every case or controversy which 
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
211 (1962))), with United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (“What government is to be 
regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political rather than a judicial 
question, and is to be determined by the political department of the government.” (quoting 
Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938))). 
 189. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 138 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing New York Times v. Sullivan and invoking 
Meiklejohn); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of 
the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208, 221 n.125 (noting, in discussing New York 
Times v. Sullivan, that “[t]he Amendment has a ‘central meaning’—a core of protection of 
speech without which democracy cannot function” and that Professor Mieklejohn had described 
the case as “an occasion for dancing in the streets”). 
 190. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710, 2714 
(2007) (overruling the holding of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 
373 (1911), that it is a per se violation of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to agree with its 
distributor to set a minimum price for the good at issue and citing Bork regarding the 
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extensive jurisprudence surrounding the enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreements pursuant to section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act.191 The judging that gave rise to those 
conceptions of law can be described as either (1) not ideological in 
any manner opposed to law or (2) ideological in a manner intrinsic to 
law itself. These views of the law defeated competing conceptions 
that, had they triumphed, would likewise have been characterized 
either as nonideological or ideological in a law-like way. 
Judges who exercise delegated or common law–making authority 
to decide cases of this sort (whether they involve First Amendment 
issues, antitrust law, or other similarly complex questions that come 
before the courts) are obliged to rely—and to do so self-consciously 
and overtly—on political and ideological values in their legal 
reasoning. This cannot seriously be doubted, nor can it reasonably be 
seen as surprising. It is merely part of the judicial function. If one 
 
“procompetitve” effects of resale price maintenance (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX 288–91 (1978))); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7, 16 (1997) (overruling the 
holding of Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), that vertical maximum price fixing is a 
per se violation of the Sherman Act and quoting Bork for the proposition that such price fixing 
had “no anticonsumer effect” (quoting BORK, supra, at 281–82)). 
 191. In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), 
the Court held that a grievance-arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agreement could 
be enforced against unions and employers under section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, id. at 451. The Court found that congressional 
policy, as embodied in section 203(d) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d), was to promote 
industrial peace and that the grievance-arbitration provision of a collective agreement was a 
major factor in achieving this goal. Id. at 453–55. In the seminal “Steelworkers Trilogy,” the 
Court amplified this policy by declaring that the parties’ agreement to arbitrate their disputes 
under a collective bargaining agreement would be enforced unless it could “be said with positive 
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the 
asserted dispute.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
582–83 (1960); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 
596–97 (1960) (part of the Steelworkers trilogy); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 
363 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1960) (same); cf. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, 
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1987) (emphasizing that a court may not set aside an arbitrator’s award 
on grounds of public policy unless the policy clearly can be “ascertained ‘by reference to laws 
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests’” 
(quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 
415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974) (holding that an employee’s statutory right to trial de novo under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, is not foreclosed by prior submission of 
claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining 
agreement); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerk’s Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 237–38 (1970) 
(holding that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104, do 
not preclude a federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation 
under a collective bargaining agreement when the agreement contains provisions enforceable 
under section 301(a) of the LMRA for binding arbitration of the grievance dispute concerning 
which the strike was called). 
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accepts that such reasoning is legal reasoning, then any regression 
model that uses a crude measure of ideology that spills over to 
evaluative reasoning of this sort will produce results that merely state 
the obvious, i.e., that judicial disagreement over how to understand 
the law helps explain variations in case outcomes. 
Empirical studies of this sort, in sum, assume not only that 
judicial decisionmaking is sometimes influenced by the ideology of 
judges, but also that ideology is invariably extrinsic to law. But this 
turns out, surprisingly, to be a normative claim (one it seems unlikely 
that most empirical theorists would actually endorse) in the guise of 
an empirical one. The fact is that most members of the legal 
profession—judges, lawyers, and scholars—subscribe to a conception 
of law that sees forms of moral or political reasoning as intrinsic to 
law in some circumstances. Thus, empirical scholars can convince us 
to accept their central claim (that extralegal judicial “ideology” 
explains variation in some legal outcomes) only if they first convince 
us that we are wrong in our view that some political and ideological 
questions are intrinsic to law itself. In other words, empirical 
ideologists must convince us that we should adopt a formalistic or 
“hard” positivistic theory that insists that legal questions never 
subsume moral or political questions. But, of course, if empirical 
scholars could do this (assuming they wanted to), they would not be 
showing that judges have been substituting their ideology for law but, 
rather, that judges have been following a conception of law that we 
should reject for normative reasons. And, if they are right in this, 
their claim would be recognized as a contribution to philosophical 
jurisprudence, not empirical legal studies. 
2. Omitted Variables. We have also argued that any empirical 
study that attempts to assess appellate decisionmaking without taking 
account of variables like the applicable law, controlling precedent, 
and judicial deliberations will be incomplete. In response to this 
critique, it can be argued that there is a difference between omitted 
variables and omitted variable bias. Omitting relevant variables 
creates bias when one has reason to believe that those variables might 
be related to ones in the model, because then one cannot rule out that 
the observed effect between the included variables and the dependent 
variable is due in whole or in part to the omitted ones. But where 
there is no correlation between independent variables, the omission 
of one should have no effect on the estimate of another on the 
dependent variable. The argument runs that because the influence of 
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law, precedent, and deliberations across cases is not correlated with 
the ideology of the judges who decide them (or with PAP or any 
other measure of it), leaving the former variables out does not bias 
any estimate of how much of the variance in outcomes is attributable 
to ideology; it merely reduces the model’s power.192 
There are at least two problems with the foregoing argument. 
First, there are convincing reasons to believe that judicial deliberation 
is an institutional practice that mitigates the impact of “bad” ideology 
(in the form of judges’ willful or subconscious indulgence of political 
or ideological predilections extrinsic to legal reasoning) on judicial 
decisionmaking. Given this reality, it is fair to assume that such “bad” 
ideology matters less, and precedent or any other law-intrinsic 
influence matter more, as the quality of judicial deliberations 
improves. Therefore, omitting variables like deliberation and 
precedent will distort the result of a theoretical analysis capable of 
measuring “bad” ideology by failing to capture a likely interaction 
between it and law-intrinsic influences like deliberation. Thus, so long 
as we have good reason to believe that the quality of judicial 
deliberations matters, we have good reason to believe that an 
empirical model that leaves out this variable will falsely suggest that 
ideology’s influence is immutable and endemic to judicial 
decisionmaking rather than the source of a correctable pathology that 
is likely concentrated in relatively discrete segments of the federal 
circuit courts at any given time. Second, empirical studies also go 
wrong when they assume that as ideological correlations go up, 
precedent correlations invariably go down. This is not a safe 
assumption, because higher correlations between ideology and case 
outcomes tell us nothing about the relationship between controlling 
precedent and case outcomes. And if a case outcome adheres to 
controlling precedent, it really does not matter whether the outcome 
is consistent with judges’ personal political or ideological views. If 
empirical ideologists want to study the effect of precedent on case 
outcomes, they need to do it directly, not simply as the inverse of 
PAP correlation. 
 
 192. Indeed, omitting variables also increases the standard errors of included variables, and 
hence the omission of precedent and deliberation may reduce the likelihood of finding a 
significant effect from ideology. See JACOB COHEN, PATRICIA COHEN, STEPHEN G. WEST & 
LEONA S. AIKEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 143–44 (3d ed. 2003). 
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3. The Bottom Line—Empirical Studies Do Not Tell Very Much 
about the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking.  We recognize 
that questions relating to crude proxies and omitted variables may be 
areas of potential disagreement. But (for the reasons indicated above) 
we do not believe that the objections that might be raised can defeat 
the principal concerns that we raise in this Article. In the end, 
however, any disagreements that arise will be of little moment. For, as 
noted above, on their own limited terms, the empirical studies that we 
have discussed show that a substantial percentage of published 
federal appellate decisions are resolved on grounds other than 
ideology and politics. We can only assume that unpublished decisions 
would show even less effect from nonlegal factors. The simple point 
here—one that has been acknowledged by several leading empirical 
legal scholars—is that empirical studies generally are not able to 
predict much about the effects of extralegal factors on appellate 
decisionmaking.193 
IV.  AN INSIDER’S LOOK194 AT THE DECISIONS OF THE  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT REVIEWING 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACTIONS BETWEEN 2000 AND 2008 
I have had the good fortune to sit as a member of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for twenty-nine years, serving as Chief 
Judge for seven years. I have worked with many brilliant colleagues 
who have been notably diverse in their backgrounds, skills, interests, 
and political leanings. I have been most impressed, however, with the 
intellect, independence, integrity, and commitment of my colleagues. 
I have never worked with a colleague who was lazy, unprepared, or 
shy about expressing his or her views. My life as an appellate judge 
has been fulfilling in large part because I have worked with colleagues 
who have been largely committed to applying the law and adhering to 
precedent, not giving vent to their political and ideological leanings. 
 
 193. See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 5, at 202 (“The close study of precedents and their impact 
[on appellate decisionmaking] is impossible with currently available or readily foreseeable 
empirical tools.”); Sisk, supra note 8, at 884 (“More sophisticated statistical models that include 
legal factors and legal reasoning as variables are perhaps the greatest priority in continued 
quantitative examination of the federal judiciary. A fully specified legal model will prove 
eternally elusive [however] because legal reasoning is not formulaic in nature: the reasonable 
parameters for debate on the determinate nature of text and doctrine cannot be described by 
number.” (footnote omitted)). 
 194. This Part has been written solely by Judge Edwards. 
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This is not to say that life on the court of appeals always has been 
easy. “During my extended tenure on the D.C. Circuit, now in its 
third decade, I have seen the court go through many different phases 
and express a number of different moods. It has gone from a divided 
and divisive place, to one stamped with the [best elements] of 
collegiality.”195 The importance of collegiality cannot be overstated. 
When I speak of a collegial court, I do not mean that all judges are 
friends. And I do not mean that the members of the court never 
disagree on substantive issues. That would not be collegiality, but 
homogeneity or conformity, which would make for a decidedly 
unhealthy judiciary. Instead, what I mean is that judges have a 
common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law 
right, and that, as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be 
persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect. Collegiality is 
a process that helps to create the conditions for principled 
agreement, by allowing all points of view to be aired and considered. 
Specifically, it is my contention that collegiality plays an important 
part in mitigating the role of partisan politics and personal ideology 
by allowing judges of differing perspectives and philosophies to 
communicate with, listen to, and ultimately influence one another in 
constructive and law-abiding ways.196 
The D.C. Circuit has benefitted from collegiality among its 
members, most notably during the last fifteen to eighteen years. This 
is not to deny that there have been sharp differences among judges 
during deliberations over some hard and very hard cases. There also 
have been some decisions that have drawn strong dissents. There 
have even been a few rehearings en banc, but not many. On 
occasions, my colleagues and I have weighed moral/political 
questions, especially when those questions are intrinsic to the law 
itself. And on some occasions, we may even have been influenced by 
extralegal factors. But for the most part, my colleagues and I have 
deliberated seriously and focused on getting the law right.197 
Based on my twenty-nine years on the court, my claim is that 
decisions are based on legal materials and are the product of fruitful 
judicial deliberations. In other words, the case record, applicable law, 
 
 195. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1648. 
 196. Id. at 1644–45 (footnotes omitted). 
 197. Judge Posner has suggested that judges “don’t deliberate very much” and that “Judicial 
deliberation is overrated.” Posner, The Role of the Judge, supra note 44, at 1051. I could not 
disagree more. It may be that his experience on the Seventh Circuit has been different from 
mine on the D.C. Circuit. 
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controlling precedent, and deliberations—not impermissible political 
or ideological considerations—are what appellate judges focus on in 
reaching a consensus in most cases, even those that are “hard” and 
“very hard.” Legal scholars who have attempted to measure “panel 
effects” to determine whether judges impermissibly rely on extralegal 
factors in their decisionmaking are merely guessing in their 
conclusions. The truth is that these scholars cannot conclusively show 
impermissible ideological voting patterns in the myriad decisions that 
issue without a dissent. For example, as Dean Richard Revesz has 
stated, “panel effects” can be explained by either a “deliberation 
hypothesis,” pursuant to which judges modify their views because 
they take seriously the views of their colleagues, or a “dissent 
hypothesis,” under which “a judge who sits with two colleagues [from 
a different political] party moderates [his or] her views in order to 
avoid [having to] writ[e] a dissent.”198 No empirical study has proven 
the truth of what has been suggested about panel effects, nor has any 
study disproved my claim that judicial deliberations produce 
consensus. 
I make the further claim that even when a decision draws a 
dissent, which is rare, this most often reflects nothing more than an 
honest disagreement among the judges over the correct legal result, 
not simply a difference in judges’ personal political or ideological 
preferences. I am convinced of this based largely on my personal 
experiences during my twenty-nine years on the bench. A recent 
review of the court’s data also tends to confirm my conviction: when 
judges do dissent, they routinely do so across perceived political lines. 
That is, in “mixed panels—panels with two judges appointed by the 
president of one party and one judge appointed by the president of 
the other party—the dissenting judge often is one of the two judges in 
the political majority. This is commonplace, as is shown in Appendix 
A. 
Landes and Posner suggest that there are relatively few dissents 
in appellate courts because judges prefer to avoid the extra work.199 In 
other words, they claim that, due to heavy workloads, appellate 
judges have little incentive to dissent, knowing that the majority 
opinion will be followed and the dissent will be ignored in future 
cases. Nothing in my experience as an appellate judge supports that 
claim. I have found that when a judge earnestly disagrees with the 
 
 198. Revesz, supra note 52, at 1112. 
 199. Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 34–35. 
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majority and believes that a point of legal principle is a stake, he or 
she will dissent. It is true that judges do not waste time writing 
separately just to offer their “voice” to the court’s disposition; but 
they do dissent when they disagree over matters that they perceive to 
be important. 
No reliable empirical study shows me to be wrong in my claim 
that, although politics, ideology, and/or cognitive factors sometimes 
affect our decisionmaking, most appellate decisions are based on legal 
materials, not extralegal factors. I say this not to gloat but because I 
am comforted—as we all should be—in knowing that it has never 
been shown that appellate judges are generally lawless in their work. 
It would be disheartening, to say the least, to think that my colleagues 
and I routinely ignore the case record, the applicable law, and 
controlling precedent and decide cases on the basis of our personal 
political views or ideological preferences. 
I cannot offer a transcript or other hard data to prove my claim 
that the decisions in most “hard” and “very hard” cases benefit from 
fruitful judicial deliberations.200 But as someone who has served on 
the court for twenty-nine years, I can confidently confirm that this is 
so. The court’s low number of dissents is a result of these 
deliberations, during which judges air their disagreements and reach 
consensus. 
Although Cross, Landes and Posner, and Sunstein all appear to 
agree that the law substantially determines outcomes in most cases, 
neither they nor I can point to any comprehensive quantitative 
studies confirming the effects of legal materials on appellate 
decisionmaking.201 And no one has even suggested a way to 
meaningfully measure the effects of confidential judicial deliberations 
on appellate decisionmaking. What I can offer, however, is a 
qualitative view of some of the work of my own court to show a few 
salient facts: (1) most decisions issue without a dissent; (2) judges 
routinely cross over presumed political lines when they do issue 
dissenting opinions; (3) “mixed panels” of the court routinely issue 
decisions in numerous complex, difficult, and important cases with no 
 
 200. “Easy” cases can be decided easily, with minimal judicial deliberations, so long as every 
judge is diligent in reviewing the case record. This is routine. 
 201. Cross and Lindquist and Cross, himself, have tried in a limited way to measure the 
effects of the law and controlling precedent on judicial decisionmaking. See CROSS, supra note 
5; Lindquist & Cross, supra note 86, at 1157–58. But a number of empirical scholars have 
acknowledged that it is very difficult to capture the effects of law and precedent in a 
quantitative study. See supra Part I.C.3. 
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dissent; (4) the written decisions in these hard and very hard cases 
show, at the very least, that panels interact in a serious way with the 
case records, the applicable law, and controlling precedent; and (5) 
the court rarely rehears cases en banc. For the data set that I looked 
at, it is also worth noting that the number of decisions reversing or 
vacating federal agency actions did not materially vary with the 
composition of the panel with respect to PAP.202 
In offering this qualitative view of the work of my court, I will 
focus on the judgments of the D.C. Circuit reviewing administrative 
agency actions between 2000 and 2008.203 I selected this eight-year 
period because a Republican president, George W. Bush, was in the 
White House, Congress was controlled by Republicans for a majority 
of the eight years, and a clear majority of the judges on the D.C. 
Circuit was appointed by Republican presidents. I selected 
administrative agency actions because it is well understood that this 
large category of cases includes some of the most difficult and 
controversial appeals heard by the D.C. Circuit. If judges’ personal 
political and ideological predilections played a significant role in their 
decisions during this period, a place to look for its effect would be the 
court’s decisions to support or overturn agency actions (in support of 
or against the Republican administration) and/or sharp divisions 
among judges along political lines. That is not what our case 
dispositions indicate. 
The members of the D.C. Circuit during the 2000–2008 period 
are shown on the accompanying chart: 
 
 202. I include this information more as a qualitative point of interest than a formalized 
analytic finding. 
 203. The data cover cases decided between September 2000 and July 2008. In the database 
compiled by the Clerk’s Office for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, cases 
involving review of administrative agency actions include matters in which a federal agency is a 
party and there is either a direct petition for review, an application for enforcement, a cross-
application for enforcement, or a direct petition for mandamus. The Clerk’s Office review of 
administrative agency actions database does not include agency actions that are first reviewed in 
the district court and then appealed to the court of appeals. Nor does it include cases that are 
resolved by special panels (that is, three-judge panels that dispose of motions for summary 
affirmance, summary reversal, dismissals for want of jurisdiction, and dismissals on grounds of 
ripeness). Special panels almost always act without hearing oral argument, and they usually 
issue unpublished judgments, orders, and memoranda disposing of the matters under review. 
Judges almost never dissent from a special panel decision; and special panels rarely reverse 
agency actions.  
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Active Members of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
September 2000–August 2008 
Name Year of 
Appointment 
Appointing 
President 
Current Status 
David B. Sentelle, 
Chief Judge 
1987 Ronald W. Reagan Chief Judge since 
February 2008 
Douglas H. Ginsburg 1986 Ronald W. Reagan Circuit Judge; served 
as Chief Judge from 
2001–2008 
Karen LeCraft 
Henderson 
1990 George H. W. 
Bush 
Circuit Judge 
A. Raymond 
Randolph 
1990 George H. W. 
Bush 
Senior Judge since 
2008 
Judith W. Rogers 1994 William J. Clinton Circuit Judge 
David S. Tatel 1994 William J. Clinton Circuit Judge 
Merrick B. Garland 1997 William J. Clinton Circuit Judge 
John G. Roberts, Jr. 2003 George W. Bush Appointed to the 
Supreme Court in 
2005 
Janice Rogers Brown 2005 George W. Bush Circuit Judge 
Thomas B. Griffith 2005 George W. Bush Circuit Judge 
Brett M. Kavanaugh 2006 George W. Bush Circuit Judge 
Harry T. Edwards 1980 James E. Carter, 
Jr. 
Senior Judge since 
2005; Chief Judge 
from 1994–2001 
Laurence H. 
Silberman 
1985 Ronald W. Reagan Senior Circuit Judge 
since 2000204 
Stephen F. Williams 1986 Ronald W. Reagan Senior Circuit Judge 
since 2001 
As can be seen from the chart, ten of the fourteen judges who served 
on the court during 2000–2008 were appointed by Republican 
presidents. Former Judge Roberts, who is now a member of the 
 
 204. Between February 2004 and March 2005, Judge Silberman served as the cochair of the 
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. 
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Supreme Court and serves as Chief Justice, was a member of the D.C. 
Circuit for two of the eight years. 
The following chart shows the number of cases involving review 
of administrative agency action during the 2000–2008 period205: 
Total Number 
of Dispositions 
of “Lead 
Cases”206 
Involving 
Review of 
Administrative 
Agency 
Actions207 
Total Number 
of Lead Case 
Dispositions 
Involving 
Review of 
Administrative 
Agency 
Actions 
Resulting in 
“Published 
Opinions” 
Total Number 
of Lead Case 
Dispositions 
Involving 
Review of 
Administrative 
Agency 
Actions in 
Which a 
Dissenting 
Opinion Issued 
Number of 
Dissents as a 
Percentage of 
“Total 
Dispositions” 
Involving 
Review of 
Administrative 
Agency 
Actions 
Number of 
Dissents as a 
Percentage of 
“Published 
Opinions” 
Involving 
Review of 
Administrative 
Agency 
Actions 
913 713 41 4% 6% 
It is clear from these data that very few dispositions involve dissenting 
opinions. During the eight years, from September 2000 through July 
2008, there were only forty-one instances in which dissenting opinions 
issued in cases involving review of administrative agency action. The 
frequency of dissents did not increase when I did a rough scan of 
agency actions that were first reviewed in the district court and then 
appealed to the court of appeals. And, notably, the percentage of 
dissenting opinions would be even smaller had I been able to 
determine the precise number of decisions issued by special panels.208 
The data also show that judges routinely crossed presumed 
political party lines when they dissented. As can be seen in the chart 
 
 205. Data compiled by and on file with the Clerk’s Office of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, Washington, D.C. 
 206. “Lead cases” include all cases that have been consolidated with the principal case 
under review. Even though the court’s decision, judgment, or order disposes of more than one 
case, only the lead case is counted. For example, a disposition may include a lead case and seven 
separate consolidated appeals or petitions for review, but the disposition counts as only one 
case. 
 207. For a definition of cases involving review of administrative agency actions, see supra 
note 203. This total number includes both published and unpublished lead case dispositions, but 
excludes unpublished decisions issued by special panels. 
 208. Special panel orders, judgments, memoranda, and opinions almost never draw a 
dissent. For an explanation of special panels, see supra note 203. The Clerk’s Office estimates 
that, from 2000–2001 through 2007–2008, special panels issued an additional 345 lead-case 
dispositions in cases involving administrative agency actions. 
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in Appendix A, only forty-one dissents were issued in 913 cases 
disposing of actions involving review of administrative agencies. 
There were “mixed panel splits” in twenty-two of the forty-one 
dispositions—that is, in three-judge panels consisting of judges 
appointed by presidents of both political parties, the two judges 
appointed by presidents of the same party disagreed; and in en banc 
dispositions, judges appointed by presidents of the same party joined 
both the majority and dissent. An additional two of the forty-one 
dissents involved situations in which all of the judges on the panel 
were appointed by presidents of the same political party and one of 
the judges dissented. These data indicate that in almost 60 percent of 
the cases in which a dissent was filed, the judges did not vote along 
presumed political party lines.209 
The chart in Appendix B offers some examples of hard and very 
hard cases, involving mixed panels in which the decision of the court 
is unanimous. These opinions are offered to show how the judges of 
the court carefully consider the record, construe the law, and apply 
precedent to reach a consensus in difficult and important cases. All of 
the cases cited involved meaningful judicial deliberations, as do most 
hard and very hard cases. It is no answer for an empirical legal scholar 
to tell us that the judges who joined the decision really did not mean 
what is said in the opinion or that some judges concurred in the result 
even though they disagreed with the outcome. Empirical legal 
scholars make such claims,210 but they are specious. We mean what we 
say in our opinions and our judgments constitute the law of the case 
and the law of the circuit.211 We take this seriously. 
During the eight-year period from September 2000 through July 
2008, the court reversed or vacated, in whole or in part, in 245 lead 
cases involving review of administrative agency action.212 The 
breakdown of these cases was as follows: 
 
 209. The figures were largely the same when I roughly scanned the agency actions that were 
first reviewed in the district court and then appealed to the court of appeals. 
 210. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 35, at 27 (discussing how attitudinalists simply assume that 
judges “vote their policy preferences and use legal principles to mask their true motives”). 
 211. See, e.g., LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1396–97 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
(holding that one panel of the court may not reconsider a prior panel’s decision in the same 
case). 
 212. Data compiled by and on file with the Clerk’s Office of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, Washington, D.C. 
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Total Number of Cases Reversed or Vacated 245 
Number of Cases Reversed or Vacated by a Panel That 
Included Three Judges Appointed by a Republican 
President 
29 
Number of Cases Reversed or Vacated by a Panel That 
Included Three Judges Appointed by a Democratic 
President 
8 
During the relevant time period, Republican judicial appointees 
outnumbered Democratic appointees by roughly three and a half to 
one. It is unsurprising, then, that panels including three judges 
appointed by Republican presidents reversed more agency decisions 
than panels including three judges appointed by Democratic 
presidents. 
Finally, during the 2000–2001 through the 2007–2008 terms, only 
two cases involving review of administrative agency actions were 
reheard en banc.213 Not only do individual judges not dissent very 
often, they do not vote to rehear cases that have been decided by 
other judges. This, too, is unsurprising to me. If members of the court 
trust their colleagues to decide cases based on the applicable law and 
controlling precedent, they are not inclined to call for en banc 
review.214 The information that is offered here does not constitute a 
rigorous quantitative study of the work of my court. But I believe that 
the data lend support to my view that, in deciding the cases that come 
before our court, my colleagues and I are committed to applying the 
law and adhering to precedent, not giving vent to our political and 
ideological leanings. In my experience, we achieve this goal most of 
the time. 
 
 213. Data compiled by and on file with the Clerk’s Office of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, Washington, D.C. 
 214. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Brian M. Boynton, The Court En Banc: 1991–2002, 70 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 259, 259–60 (2002) (noting that the number of en banc cases heard by the 
D.C. Circuit declined from sixty-three in the 1980s to thirty-three in the 1990s); see also id. at 
260 (arguing that the decrease in the number of cases reheard en banc in the D.C. Circuit could 
be partially attributed to the judges becoming “more collegial, in the sense that the judges, 
notwithstanding their different views, had more confidence in each other’s good faith and 
competence, and so deferred more to judgments of panels on which they did not sit”). 
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V.  CULTURAL COGNITION AND JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS 
A. Cultural Cognition 
As noted in the earlier Parts of this Article, in seeking to 
determine the effects of nonlegal factors on judicial decisionmaking 
in the federal courts of appeals, empirical legal scholars routinely 
“correlate[] federal judges’ decisions with some measure of their 
ideology, typically the political party of the President who appointed 
them.”215 There are some scholars who now argue that proponents of 
the “ideology thesis” have failed to “adequately specif[y] the 
mechanism by which they understand values to be influencing judges. 
They have failed, in particular, to distinguish between values as a 
self-conscious motive for decisionmaking and values as a subconscious 
influence on cognition.”216 These scholars, most notably Professor Dan 
Kahan of the Yale Law School and his colleagues at the Cultural 
Cognition Project,217 argue that there is a significant difference 
between ideology and cultural cognition and that it makes a 
difference whether judges are affected by one or the other. 
Kahan suggests that there are three very distinct ways in which 
judges’ values might influence decisionmaking. “First, values could 
supply a self-conscious partisan motivation for decision. That is, 
judges could be choosing the outcome that best promotes their 
political preferences without regard for the law.”218 
Second, values could supply a self-conscious legal motivation for 
decision. On one popular account of judicial decisionmaking, 
particularly in constitutional law, there is not a strict separation 
 
 215. Kahan, supra note 9, at 1. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Yale Law School, The Cultural Cognition Project, http://culturalcognition.net/ (“The 
Cultural Cognition Project is a group of scholars from Yale and other universities interested in 
studying how cultural values shape the public’s risk perceptions and related policy beliefs. 
Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their beliefs about disputed 
matters of fact (for example, whether global warming is a serious threat; whether the death 
penalty deters murder; whether gun control makes society more safe or less) to values that 
define their cultural identities. Project members are using the methods of various disciplines—
including social psychology, anthropology, communications, and political science—to chart the 
impact of this phenomenon and to identify the mechanisms through which it operates. The 
Project also has an explicit normative objective: to identify processes of democratic 
decisionmaking by which society can resolve culturally grounded differences in belief in a 
manner that is both congenial to persons of diverse cultural outlooks and consistent with sound 
public policymaking.”). 
 218. Kahan, supra note 9, at 3. 
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between moral reasoning and legal reasoning. Judges must resort to 
normative theories to connect abstract concepts like ‘free speech’ 
and ‘equal protection’ to particular cases.219 
Finally, judges’ understandings of what the law requires may be 
“shaped by their values—operating not as resources for theorizing 
law, but as a subconscious, extralegal influence on their perception of 
legally consequential facts.”220 In other words, especially in areas of 
law when it is very difficult “to verify (or falsify) empirical claims by 
objective data . . . judges perforce fall back on their emotions or 
intuitions. They practice . . . ‘cultural cognition.’”221 
In an article authored by Professor Kahan and Professor Donald 
Braman, the authors explain that cultural cognition “refers to the 
tendency of individuals to conform their views about risks and 
benefits of putatively dangerous activities to their cultural evaluations 
of those activities.”222 This tendency extends to evaluations of “the 
instrumental efficacy (or perversity) of law” based on “cultural 
evaluations of the activities subject to regulation.”223 Under the 
cultural cognition theory, it is assumed that “people are motivated to 
believe that behavior they find noble is also socially beneficial (or at 
least benign) and behavior they find base is also socially harmful.”224 
Professor Kahan offers cogent examples of what he and his colleagues 
have in mind: 
Psychologically speaking, it’s much easier, to believe that behavior 
one finds noble is also socially beneficial, and behavior one finds 
base is dangerous, than vice versa. Persons who have relatively 
individualistic values, for example, tend to be skeptical about 
environment risks, because they perceive (subconsciously) that 
concerns about such risks could lead to restrictions on commerce 
and industry, activities that people with individualistic values like. 
People with egalitarian values, in contrast, see commerce and 
industry as sources of unjust disparities in wealth, and thus readily 
embrace the claim that these activities are environmentally harmful, 
 
 219. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted). 
 220. Id. at 5. 
 221. Posner, The Role of the Judge, supra note 44, at 1065. 
 222. Kahan, supra note 9, at 5. 
 223. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 149, 152 (2006). 
 224. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to 
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 852 
(2009). 
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and should be regulated. Research . . . shows that these dynamics 
generate political conflict on a host of risk issues, from global 
warming to domestic terrorism, from school shootings to mandatory 
vaccination of school girls against HPV. 
  Research [additionally] . . . shows that cultural cognition also 
creates conflict over legally consequential facts. In one study, for 
example, we found that people of egalitarian and hierarchical 
dispositions tend to form opposing beliefs about ambiguous facts in 
controversial self-defense cases. Egalitarians tended to believe, and 
hierarchs to disbelieve, that a battered woman who killed her 
abusive husband in his sleep faced a genuine threat, honestly 
believed she was in danger, had no realistic opportunity to escape, 
and suffered from a psychological impairment of perception; 
however, in a case involving a beleaguered commuter who killed a 
panhandling African-American teen, it was hierarchs who believed, 
and egalitarians who disbelieved, the parallel set of pro-defense 
factual claims. 
  In a second study, [we] found that cultural cognition influenced 
perceptions among subjects who watched a videotape of a 
high-speed car chase, shot from inside a police cruiser. In Scott v. 
Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that “no reasonable jury” 
could watch the tape and fail to conclude the driver posed a risk 
sufficiently lethal to justify deadly force to stop him (namely, the 
ramming of his car). But we found that hierarchical and 
individualistic white males were significantly more likely to perceive 
that than were egalitarians and communitarians of either race or 
gender.225 
The idea of cultural cognition, at least as described by Professor 
Kahan and his colleagues, does not square with Judge Posner’s view 
of “ideology.”226 Judge Posner argues that “the sources of ideology are 
both cognitive and psychological,”227 but he and other empiricists 
focus their studies of appellate decisionmaking on the relationships 
between case outcomes and observable political factors (for example, 
the political party of appointing president). The scholars who seek to 
study the effects of cultural cognition on decisionmaking train their 
sights on subconscious influences that may affect a judge’s votes. Any 
 
 225. Kahan, supra note 9, at 5–6 (footnotes omitted). 
 226. See Posner, The Role of the Judge, supra note 44, at 1059. 
 227. Id. at 1060. 
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relationships between such subconscious influences and the 
observable political factors studied by Judge Posner are far from 
proven. 
Furthermore, the cultural cognition thesis is not simply the 
attitudinal model by another name. Variants of the attitudinal model 
often are premised on notions of legal realism, which posits that 
“legal decisionmaking is substantially congruent with decisionmaking 
simpliciter, and . . . legal justification, which attempts to make legal 
decisionmaking look more different from nonlegal decisionmaking 
than it in fact is, is best seen as a form of stylized and post hoc 
rationalization.”228 Professor Kahan and his colleagues do not 
subscribe to this view.  
It would not take a flight of fancy to believe that judges are 
sometimes affected by subconscious influences on cognition. Does it 
matter that this influence is subconscious rather than intentional? Or, 
more pointedly, “Does it make any difference whether [appellate] 
decisions . . . reflect values as a self-conscious partisan influence on 
decisionmaking—the conventional understanding of the ideology 
thesis—or as a subconscious cognitive one in the way the cultural 
cognition theory contemplates?”229 Professor Kahan argues that 
[n]ot only would the cultural cognition thesis, if true, spare us from 
the disappointment associated with believing that judicial 
disagreement stems from self-conscious, and self-consciously 
concealed, political disregard for law. It would also supply us with 
tools for mitigating this form of judicial conflict. Research has a [sic] 
revealed a variety of techniques for counteracting cultural cognition. 
Many of these techniques could likely be employed by judges, 
who . . . recognize that they, like everyone else, are prone to adopt 
factual beliefs congenial to their values.230 
If scholars were able to catalog meaningfully the effects of 
cultural cognition on appellate decisionmaking, the data surely would 
be more illuminating than studies resting on judges’ assumed political 
predilections as determined by the party of the presidents who 
appointed the judges. Individuals are a composite of personal values 
that extend well beyond their allegiances to political parties.231 And 
individual views may vary (say, from “conservative,” to “moderate,” 
 
 228. Schauer & Wise, supra note 43, at 1096–97. 
 229. Kahan, supra note 9, at 8–9. 
 230. Id. at 9. 
 231. This point is well documented in Kahan et al., supra note 224, at 879. 
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to “liberal”) on different issues.232 We would understand much more 
about individual judges and how they think if we understood 
cognitive influences on their decisionmaking. 
It is far from clear, however, that empirical scholars will ever be 
able to meaningfully measure the effects of cultural cognition on 
appellate decisionmaking. Even if data could be collected on the 
subconscious factors that influence individual judges—no easy task in 
itself—it would tell us very little about the product of deliberations 
between appellate judges. Individual judges change their minds 
during the course of judicial deliberations. While it is possible that 
cultural cognition influences how judges view underlying facts or even 
legal precedent, the process of deliberation in a collegial environment 
can reduce the impact of any individual judge’s cultural cognition. 
[J]udging on the appellate bench is a group process. Too often 
researchers ignore the fact that appellate judges sit in panels of three 
and decide cases together through deliberation. A model that takes 
each appellate judge as an atomized individual casting a purely 
individual vote in any given case will not produce a good 
explanation of how judges decide cases. The appellate courts are 
courts of collective decision, and appellate judges act collectively as 
a court in disposing of cases.233 
In other words, it is likely the case that judicial deliberations 
often will counter any effects of cultural cognition. Therefore, in their 
effort to understand the effects of extralegal factors on appellate 
decisionmaking, studies of cultural cognition must also take account 
of the influence of judicial deliberations; this will be no easy feat 
given that these deliberations are confidential.234 
B. Judicial Deliberations 
Judicial deliberations, broadly understood, are pervasive 
throughout the judicial process.235 Judicial colleagues who have 
 
 232. Id. at 879–80. 
 233. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1656. 
 234. See Hensler, supra note 85, at 63 (“Researchers simply do not have available very good 
quantitative approaches to studying large social organizations [like courts] or interaction 
processes [within the courts].”). 
 235. Deliberation and its hallmarks are at the core of a collegial court: 
The deliberately cultivated attitude among judges of equal status and sometimes 
widely differing views working in intimate, continuing, open, and noncompetitive 
relationship with each other, which manifests respect for the strengths of the others, 
restrains one’s pride of authorship, while respecting one’s own deepest convictions, 
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worked together over time and come to know each others’ 
perspectives and views can anticipate one another’s initial “takes” on 
certain cases without ever having to discuss the case in detail. In many 
such situations, a judge’s cultural cognition can be moderated in 
anticipation of a colleague’s views—a kind of tacit deliberation. 
Judges deliberate when they raise questions during oral argument to 
alert their colleagues to their concerns. Judges deliberate in 
conference and continue to deliberate after conference when they 
raise issues uncovered in their research. Judges deliberate when they 
circulate draft opinions, receive their colleagues’ responses, and 
negotiate resolutions to any differences. 
There may be some judges who care little about their colleagues’ 
views and who are determined not to engage in collegial interactions. 
However, they are not in the majority. Unless an appellate court is 
fractured due to an absence of collegiality, appellate judges routinely 
deliberate in reaching their decisions.236 Indeed, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States has placed collegiality at the center 
of its definition of a “court”: 
[A] “court” is a cohesive group of individuals who are familiar with 
one another’s way of thinking, reacting, persuading, and being 
persuaded. The court becomes an institution – an incorporeal body 
of precedent and tradition, of shared experiences and collegial 
feelings, whose members possess a common devotion to mastering 
circuit law, maintaining its coherence and consistency (thus assuring 
its predictability), and adjudicating cases in like manner.237 
During the course of judicial deliberations, judges more often 
than not persuade one another until a consensus is reached. The 
effect of any individual judge’s cultural cognition is thereby limited.238 
Because of this important group dynamic, “[a]ny credible attempt to 
explain judges’ behavior . . . must take account of the collective 
nature of the enterprise. . . . While a judge spends much time working 
alone, the crucial decisional points in appellate judging occur in the 
 
values patience in understanding and compromise in nonessentials, and seeks as much 
excellence in the court’s decision as the combined talents, experience, insight, and 
energy of the judges permit. 
FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING AND JUDGING 215 (1994). 
 236. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1648. 
 237. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 
44 (1995). 
 238. See Kahan et al., supra note 224, at 900–01. 
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company of, and in active engagement with, one’s colleagues.”239 
When empirical legal scholars conduct studies that rely solely on the 
voting records of appellate judges and case outcomes, they do not 
learn enough to fully understand appellate decisionmaking. 
[S]tudy of groups also requires consideration of interpersonal 
interaction and influence. The fact that two or more Justices vote 
together is rather weak evidence that their votes are the result of 
interaction; standing alone, voting records tell very little about the 
force or direction of any interpersonal influence that may exist. 
Small group analysis requires other kinds of data and a more general 
understanding of the impact of a group decisional situation on 
individual behavior.240 
The group dynamics of judicial decisionmaking are influenced by 
a variety of intangible factors including the relative intelligence of the 
participating judges, intimidation, friendship, age, aversion to 
confrontation, a belief that little is to be gained in disagreement, 
impatience, institutional norms and/or rules, and views of the trial 
court judge. Special expertise of a particular judge or a reputation for 
thoughtfulness and preparation can be credited by other judges 
during the deliberation process. Perhaps most important is the role of 
precedent in deliberation. All judges are bound by precedent, and 
almost all judges recognize this fact. Therefore, arguments about the 
meaning of precedent, and the legitimate readings that can be given 
to governing precedent, are crucially significant in every case. 
Because precedent can be read according to rules that are broadly 
shared and understood, even if not objective or universal, judges who 
might agree about little else can come to a common reading of 
governing law. Consensus typically fails only when the governing 
precedent is read in divergent and irreconcilable ways, and judges 
disagree in how they would exercise any discretion that is given to the 
court by a lack of clarity in the governing law. Before judges admit to 
that failure, however, they have ample opportunity to persuade and 
look for a reasonable resolution on legal grounds. 
In light of these considerations, there are significant difficulties 
faced by scholars seeking to build useful models of judicial 
decisionmaking from which generalizations may be drawn regarding 
the effects of cultural cognition on appellate decisionmaking. It is one 
 
 239. Edwards, Collegiality, supra note 3, at 1656, 1657. 
 240. Walter F. Murphy, Courts as Small Groups, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1566–67 (1966). 
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thing to determine how cultural cognition or ideology may cause 
different individuals to view the same evidence differently. It is quite 
another matter, however, to determine how and why the views of 
these individuals change when they deliberate over their differing 
views with an eye toward reaching a consensus. 
CONCLUSION 
The growing field of empirical legal studies need not conflict 
with “the persistent normative appeal of the legal model of 
judging.”241 Rather, properly conducted, empirical legal studies can 
supplement traditional legal scholarship to “help[] inform litigants, 
policymakers, and society as a whole about how the legal system 
works.”242 Both judges and scholars can benefit from a productive 
conversation between their two perspectives on appellate 
decisionmaking. 
The potential for fruitful dialogue is lost when judges and 
empirical scholars are unable to communicate. There are many 
possible reasons for this failure, such as scholars’ use of terms like 
“ideology variables” (rather than “appointment variables”) in their 
studies. These terms tend to obscure rather than illuminate the issues 
under study and add an unnecessary charge to what might otherwise 
be a dispassionate discussion of methodological techniques. And 
models of appellate decisionmaking that reduce judging to either the 
application of fully determinate law or the exercise of bare political 
power are not only overly simplistic, but carry a normative valence 
that undermines the credibility of the many members of the judiciary 
who routinely put aside personal preferences and give due respect to 
the law. 
In order for empirical scholarship to serve its highest function, it 
is of the utmost importance that scholars in this field acknowledge the 
limits of their research and maintain an appropriate level of modesty 
in their claims. Human institutions that are built on trust, respect, and 
a willingness to set aside personal interests for the good of society are 
fragile. It is important that institutions serving the public—and the 
individuals who comprise them—receive useful feedback. But 
critiques will not be taken seriously unless they are well targeted and 
 
 241. Sisk, supra note 8, at 894. 
 242. Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1741, 1741 (2004). 
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supported in fact. Empirical legal studies can play a productive role in 
strengthening legal institutions by providing insights on the judicial 
process and suggesting areas for reform. This productive role will 
only increase as the field matures in its understanding of what it can, 
and cannot, do. 
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APPENDIX A243 
Dissenting Opinions in Cases Involving Review of Administrative 
Agency Actions from September 2000–July 2008 
Case Name; Citation; 
and Court Term 
Majority 
and Judge 
Writing for 
Majority (*)  
Dissenting 
Judge[s] 
[“MPS”= 
mixed panel 
split]244 
[“PS” = panel 
split]245 
Court’s Action as 
Described in Westlaw 
 
Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 208 F.3d 229 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) 
Tatel* 
Rogers 
Sentelle Cross-application 
granted; petition 
denied. 
Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 237 F.3d 639 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) 
Tatel* 
Edwards 
Williams 
Rogers 
Tatel 
Silberman 
Sentelle* 
Ginsburg* 
Henderson 
Randolph 
[MPS] 
Enforcement granted. 
Crowley Marine Servs., 
Inc. v. NLRB, 234 F.3d 
1295 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(per curiam) 
(per curiam) 
Edwards 
Sentelle 
Henderson 
[MPS] 
Petition denied; 
cross-application 
granted. 
Yukon-Kuskokwim 
Health Corp. v. NLRB, 
234 F.3d 714 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) 
Ginsburg* 
Tatel 
Randolph 
[MPS] 
Enforcement denied; 
remanded. 
Garvey Marine, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 245 F.3d 819 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) 
Ginsburg* 
Rogers 
Randolph 
[MPS] 
Employer’s petition 
denied; Board’s 
application granted. 
 
 243. Cases compiled by the Clerk’s Office of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
Washington, D.C. 
 244. “MPS” denotes decisions involving mixed panels, that is, a three-judge panel consisting 
of judges appointed by presidents of both political parties in which the two judges appointed by 
presidents of the same party disagree. In an en banc decision, it means that judges appointed by 
presidents of the same party joined both the majority and dissent. 
 245. “PS” denotes decisions in which all of the judges on the panel were appointed by 
presidents of the same political party, and one of the judges dissented. 
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Ross Stores, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 235 F.3d 669 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) 
Henderson* 
Randolph 
Garland Petition for review 
granted in part and 
denied in part, and 
enforcement denied in 
part. 
    
Sinclair Broad. Group, 
Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 
148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
Rogers* 
Williams 
Sentelle 
[MPS] 
Remanded. 
Ruggiero v. FCC, 278 
F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) 
Tatel* 
Rogers 
Henderson Relief granted. 
KPMG, LLP v. SEC, 
289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) 
Rogers* 
Henderson 
Randolph 
[MPS] 
Petition denied. 
Seattle Opera v. 
NLRB, 292 F.3d 757 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) 
Henderson* 
Rogers 
 
Randolph 
[MPS] 
Petition denied; cross-
application granted. 
New World Radio, Inc. 
v. FCC, 294 F.3d 164 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) 
Henderson* 
Rogers 
Randolph 
[MPS] 
Appeal dismissed. 
BFI Waste Sys. of N. 
Am., Inc. v. FAA, 293 
F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) 
Henderson* 
Sentelle 
Tatel Relief granted. 
Am. Corn Growers 
Ass’n v. EPA, 291 
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(per curiam) 
(per curiam) 
Edwards 
Randolph 
Garland 
[MPS] 
Regulation sustained 
in part and vacated in 
part. 
ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. 
Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 
1071 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
Sentelle* 
Ginsburg 
Edwards Petitions for review 
denied. 
    
Sec’y of Labor, Mine 
Safety & Health 
Admin. v. Excel 
Mining, LLC, 334 F.3d 
1 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
Garland* 
Rogers 
 
Sentelle Petition granted; 
reversed. 
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Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 
F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) 
Ginsburg* 
Edwards 
Sentelle 
Henderson 
Randolph 
Rogers 
Tatel 
[MPS] 
Relief denied. 
Int’l Alliance of 
Theatrical & Stage 
Employees v. NLRB, 
334 F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) 
Sentelle* 
Henderson 
Tatel Employers’ and 
carpenters’ union’s 
petitions granted; 
theatrical employees’ 
union’s petition 
dismissed; cross-
application denied. 
21st Century Telesis 
Joint Venture v. FCC, 
318 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) 
Rogers* 
Randolph 
Williams 
[MPS] 
Petition dismissed in 
part and denied in 
part. 
    
Pub. Util. Comm’n v. 
FERC, 367 F.3d 925 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) 
Randolph* 
Sentelle 
Rogers Petition for review 
denied. 
Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. 
EPA, 374 F.3d 1363 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam) 
(per curiam) 
Randolph 
Sentelle 
Rogers 
 
Vacated and 
remanded. 
    
Brewers & Maltsters, 
Local Union No. 6 v. 
NLRB, 414 F.3d 36 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) 
Rogers* 
Ginsburg 
Sentelle 
[MPS] 
Employer’s petition 
denied; union’s 
petition granted; 
remanded. 
Federated Logistics & 
Operations v. NLRB, 
400 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) 
Sentelle* 
Tatel 
Henderson 
[MPS] 
Petition denied. 
Rainbow/PUSH Coal. 
v. FCC, 396 F.3d 1235 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) 
Henderson* 
Tatel 
Rogers 
[MPS] 
Appeal dismissed. 
EDWARDS IN FINAL.DOC 5/25/2009  4:05:32 PM 
2009] PITFALLS OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 1971 
 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 
415 F.3d 50 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) 
Randolph* 
Tatel 
Tatel 
Sentelle 
[MPS] 
Petitions dismissed or 
denied. 
    
Detroit Newspaper 
Agency v. NLRB, 435 
F.3d 302 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) 
Edwards* 
Williams 
Henderson 
[MPS] 
Remanded. 
Vill. of Bensenville v. 
FAA, 457 F.3d 52 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) 
Rogers* 
Henderson 
Griffith 
[MPS] 
Petitions for review 
denied. 
Am. Council on Educ. 
v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) 
Sentelle* 
Brown 
Edwards Petition denied. 
    
Nat’l Ass’n of 
Regulatory Util. 
Comm’rs v. FERC, 475 
F.3d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) 
Williams* 
Edwards 
Sentelle 
[MPS] 
Orders upheld. 
Aeronautical Repair 
Station Ass’n, Inc. v. 
FAA, 494 F.3d 161 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) 
Henderson* 
Tatel 
Sentelle 
[MPS] 
Affirmed in part and 
remanded in part. 
Am. Chemistry 
Council v. Dep’t of 
Transp., 468 F.3d 810 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) 
Griffith* 
Sentelle 
Rogers Petitions dismissed. 
Ass’n of Irritated 
Residents v. EPA, 494 
F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) 
Sentelle* 
Kavanaugh 
Rogers Petitions dismissed. 
Sec’y of Labor, Mine 
Safety & Health 
Admin. v. Nat’l 
Cement Co., 494 F.3d 
1066 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
Henderson* 
Sentelle 
Rogers Vacated and 
remanded. 
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Fin. Planning Ass’n v. 
SEC, 482 F.3d 481 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) 
Rogers* 
Kavanaugh 
Garland 
[MPS] 
Petition granted and 
rule vacated. 
PNC Fin. Servs. Group, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 
503 F.3d 119 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) 
Brown* 
Rogers 
Griffith 
[MPS] 
Affirmed. 
Natural Res. Def. 
Council v. EPA, 489 
F.3d 1250 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) 
Henderson* 
Randolph 
Rogers Rules vacated and 
remanded. 
Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Highway Traffic 
Safety Admin., 489 
F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) 
Kavanaugh* 
Randolph 
Sentelle 
[PS] 
Petition concerning 
Safety Standard 110 
was dismissed for lack 
of subject matter 
jurisdiction; petition 
challenging the 
adoption of Safety 
Standard 138 
dismissed for lack of 
standing; and action 
on petition filed by 
Public Citizen 
postponed pending the 
filing of supplemental 
submissions. 
    
Cogeneration Ass’n of 
Cal. v. FERC, 525 F.3d 
1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
Griffith* 
Kavanaugh 
Randolph 
[PS] 
Petition denied. 
Ass’n of Civilian 
Technicians, N.Y. State 
Council v. FLRA, 507 
F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) 
Sentelle* 
Griffith 
Tatel Dismissed. 
Agri Processor Co. v. 
NLRB, 514 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) 
Tatel* 
Henderson 
Kavanaugh 
[MPS] 
Petition denied and 
cross-petition granted. 
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Am. Bird Conservancy, 
Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.3d 
1027 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(per curiam) 
(per curiam) 
Rogers 
Garland 
Kavanaugh Vacated in part. 
Am. Radio Relay 
League, Inc. v. FCC, 
524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) 
Rogers* 
Tatel 
Kavanaugh Petition granted in 
part and remanded. 
  SUMMARY  
 Mixed Panel Splits. There were “mixed panel splits” in twenty-two 
of the forty-one dispositions—that is, in three-judge panels consisting 
of judges appointed by presidents of both political parties, the two 
judges appointed by presidents of the same party disagreed; and, in 
en banc dispositions, judges appointed by presidents of the same 
party joined both the majority and dissent. 
 Split Panels. Two of the forty-one dissents involved situations in 
which all of the judges on the panel were appointed by presidents of 
the same political party and one of the judges dissented. 
These data indicate that in twenty-four of the forty-one cases in 
which a dissent was filed (59 percent), the judges did not vote along 
presumed political party lines. 
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APPENDIX B 
A Sample of Unanimous Decisions Involving “Mixed Panels” 
Reviewing Complicated and Important Administrative Agency 
Actions September 2000–July 2008 
Case Name; 
Citation; and 
Court Term 
Panel and 
Judge 
Writing (*) 
Description from the Court Opinion or 
Westlaw 
BNSF Ry. 
Co. v. Surface 
Transp. Bd., 
526 F.3d 770 
(D.C. Cir. 
2008) 
 
Ginsburg 
Rogers 
Kavanaugh* 
The Surface Transportation Board changed 
aspects of its rail rate-setting methodology. 
Railroads and shippers both petitioned for 
review—railroads arguing that certain 
changes improperly benefit shippers and 
shippers arguing that certain changes 
improperly benefit railroads. The court 
concluded that the board’s changes were 
reasonable and reasonably explained. 
Petitions for review denied. 
Pirlott v. 
NLRB, 522 
F.3d 423 
(D.C. Cir. 
2008) 
Randolph, 
Rogers 
Edwards* 
Bargaining unit employees filed unfair labor 
practice charges against their local union, 
complaining it violated its duty of fair 
representation by spending their dues for 
organizing activities and failing to provide 
them with adequate financial disclosures. The 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
found that the union’s financial disclosures 
were adequate but determined that the union 
had not justified its expenditures. The union 
petitioned for review, and the NLRB 
cross-applied for enforcement of its order. 
The court held that (1) remand was 
warranted for NLRB to reconsider the issue 
of adequacy of the union’s financial 
disclosure in light of intervening case law; (2) 
the charging parties were not “aggrieved” 
within meaning of National Labor Relations 
Act on the issue of whether expenses 
incurred in organizing employees of other 
employers could ever be charged to 
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objectors; and (3) the NLRB did not 
arbitrarily depart from precedent, 
misconstrue evidence before it, or deny the 
union a fair hearing in finding that the 
union’s organizing expenses were not 
germane to employees. Petition denied, 
cross-application granted in part, and case 
remanded. 
Maine Pub. 
Util. Comm’n 
v. FERC, 520 
F.3d 464 
(D.C. Cir. 
2008) (per 
curiam) 
 
(per curiam) 
Rogers 
Garland 
Silberman 
Consolidated petitions for review challenged 
the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission’s (FERC’) approval of a 
comprehensive settlement that redesigned 
New England’s capacity market. The Maine 
Public Utilities Commission and the 
attorneys general of Connecticut and 
Massachusetts asserted that FERC’s 
approval of the settlement was arbitrary and 
capricious, contrary to law, and beyond the 
commission’s jurisdiction. The court rejected 
most of these arguments but agreed with the 
petitioners that the commission unlawfully 
deprived nonsettling parties of their rights 
under the Federal Power Act. Petitions 
denied in part, granted in part, and case 
remanded.  
New Jersey v. 
EPA, 517 
F.3d 574 
(D.C. Cir. 
2008) 
Rogers* 
Tatel 
Brown 
States and other parties petitioned for review 
of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
rules regarding the emission of hazardous air 
pollutants from coal- and oil-fired electric 
utility steam-generating units. The principal 
issue was whether the EPA had authority to 
delist coal- and oil-fired utility units without 
following statutory delisting provisions. The 
court held: Once EPA determined that 
certain coal- and oil-fired electric utility 
steam generating units were to be regulated 
as sources of hazardous air pollutants under 
the Clean Air Act, the EPA had no authority 
to delist them without following a provision 
governing the removal of any source 
category. A provision of the Clean Air Act 
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which imposed certain requirements upon 
the EPA in delisting certain electric utility 
steam generating units as sources of 
hazardous air pollutants was not ambiguous, 
notwithstanding a separate provision which 
allowed the EPA to make a determination as 
to whether power plants should be regulated 
as emitting hazardous air pollutants; a 
provision granting the EPA discretion 
governed how the EPA was to decide 
whether to list units but said nothing about 
delisting units, and had Congress wished to 
except units from delisting requirements, it 
would have said so explicitly. Petitions 
granted and rule vacated. 
Mail 
Contractors 
of Am. v. 
NLRB, 514 
F.3d 27 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) 
 
Ginsburg* 
Tatel 
Brown 
Court held that the NLRB’s decision, that an 
employer violated National Labor Relations 
Act when, following an impasse, it 
unilaterally imposed provision reserving right 
to change truck drivers’ relay points, was 
arbitrary and capricious. Petition for review 
granted. 
   
Qwest Servs. 
Corp. v. FCC, 
509 F.3d 531 
(D.C. Cir. 
2007) 
Sentelle 
Tatel 
Williams* 
Prepaid calling card provider and local 
exchange carrier petitioned for review of 
order of FCC ruling that both internet 
protocol (IP) transport cards, which use IP 
technology to transport part or all of 
telephone call, and menu-driven cards, which 
offer menu-driven interface through which 
users can either make call or access several 
types of information, offer 
“telecommunications services” subject to 
payment-of-access charges to local exchange 
carriers and other obligations, under 
Telecommunications Act, but which 
retroactively applied ruling only to 
IP-transport cards, but not menu-driven 
cards. Holdings: (1) bifurcation of FCC 
proceeding was not barred; (2) retroactive 
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application of order to IP-transport cards was 
not manifest injustice; (3) local exchange 
carrier had standing; and (4) retroactive 
application of order to menu-driven cards 
would not be manifest injustice. Order 
vacated in part. 
PAZ Sec., 
Inc. v. SEC, 
494 F.3d 1059 
(D.C. Cir. 
2007) 
 
Ginsburg* 
Rogers 
Kavanaugh 
 
Securities firm and its president petitioned 
for review of an order of the SEC upholding 
the decision of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) to expel firm 
from membership and to bar president from 
ever associating with any NASD member 
firm as sanctions for president’s failure to 
respond to the NASD’s repeated requests for 
information from and about firm. Court held 
that SEC abused its discretion in failing to 
address certain mitigating factors raised by 
the petitioners, and in failing to identify any 
remedial – as opposed to punitive – purpose 
for the sanctions it approved. Petitions for 
review granted and case remanded for SEC 
to consider anew whether the sanctions were 
excessive or oppressive 
Owner-Oper
ator Indep. 
Drivers Ass’n 
v. Fed. Motor 
Carrier 
Safety 
Admin., 494 
F.3d 188 
(D.C. Cir. 
2007) 
 
Ginsburg 
Henderson 
Garland* 
Two groups—one led by public citizen and 
the other by the Owner-Operator 
Independent Drivers Association—sought 
review of rules adopted by the Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration regulating the 
hours of commercial long-haul truck drivers. 
The court rejected the challenges raised by 
the owner-operators, but granted the petition 
filed by Public Citizen, Inc. The court 
concluded that the agency violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
because it failed to give interested parties an 
opportunity to comment on the methodology 
of the crash-risk model that the agency used 
to justify an increase in the maximum 
number of daily and weekly hours that truck 
drivers may drive and work. The court also 
found that the agency failed to provide an 
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explanation for critical elements of that 
methodology. Petition granted in part and 
denied in part. 
San Manuel 
Indian Bingo 
& Casino v. 
NLRB, 475 
F.3d 1306 
(D.C. Cir. 
2007) 
Garland 
Brown* 
Williams 
Petitioners claimed that the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) did not apply to 
employment at a casino the San Manuel 
Band of Serrano Mission Indians operates on 
its reservation. Because the casino employed 
many non-Indians and catered primarily to 
non-Indians, the court upheld the NLRB’s 
decision that the NLRA applied to 
employment at this casino. The petition for 
review was denied. 
   
Envtl. Def. v. 
EPA, 467 
F.3d 1329 
(D.C. Cir. 
2006) 
Randolph 
Tatel 
Griffith* 
Environmental organizations brought a 
petition for review from final order of EPA 
challenging three sets of regulations 
governing how states were to bring 
transportation plans into conformity with 
Clean Air Act. Held: (1) court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear belated challenge to 
regulation; (2) regulation establishing interim 
tests for demonstrating conformity to 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards was 
unreasonable; and (3) regulation providing 
for use of interim tests for making conformity 
determinations under State Implementation 
Plans was proper. Petition granted in part, 
denied in part, and dismissed in part.  
EarthLink, 
Inc. v. FCC, 
462 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 
2006) 
Sentelle 
Brown* 
Edwards 
The FCC agreed not to require the Bell 
Operating Companies to provide their 
competitors with “unbundled” access to 
certain fiber-based network facilities. 
EarthLink, Inc., an internet service provider 
that benefits from such unbundling, 
challenged the FCC’s order. The court 
concluded that the agency’s interpretation 
and application of the statutory scheme were 
permissible and thus denied the petition for 
review. 
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In re Core 
Commc’ns, 
Inc., 455 F.3d 
267 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) 
Tatel 
Garland* 
Sentelle 
Petitioners challenged the FCC’s refusal to 
forebear in the enforcement of intercarrier 
compensation rules governing 
telecommunications traffic bound for 
internet service providers. The court found 
that FCC’s decision was not arbitrary and 
capricious and thus denied the petitions for 
review. 
Niagara 
Mohawk 
Power Corp. 
v. FERC, 452 
F.3d 822 
(D.C. Cir. 
2006) 
Griffith 
Edwards 
Silberman* 
New York electric power utilities and the 
New York State Public Service Commission 
petitioned for review of FERC orders 
approving and enforcing a tariff filed by the 
New York Independent System Operator 
(NYISO), the manager of New York’s 
electric power transmission facilities. The 
tariff allowed electricity generators that 
provided power to the transmission grid to 
avoid transmission and local distribution 
charges for the power these generators take 
from the grid for such purposes as heating, 
air conditioning, lighting, and powering office 
equipment, so long as the power the 
generators produced in any month exceeded 
the power taken. Petitioners asserted that 
FERC’s approval of monthly netting for 
NYISO was unlawful and unreasonable and 
that the netting formula imposed in the 
NYISO tariff should be supplanted with a 
one-hour netting period. The court denied 
the petition for review. 
Goldstein v. 
SEC, 451 
F.3d 873 
(D.C. Cir. 
2006) 
 
Randolph* 
Edwards 
Griffith 
The SEC’s hedge-fund rule, requiring that 
investors in a hedge fund be counted as 
clients of the fund’s adviser for purposes of 
fewer-than-fifteen-clients exemption from 
registration under Investment Advisers Act, 
was invalid as conflicting with purposes 
underlying the statute. Rule vacated and case 
remanded. 
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Nat’l Ass’n of 
Sec. Dealers, 
Inc. v. SEC, 
431 F.3d 803 
(D.C. Cir. 
2005)  
Tatel 
Brown 
Edwards* 
The National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) wears two institutional 
hats: it serves as a professional association, 
promoting the interests of it members, and it 
serves as a quasi-governmental agency, with 
express statutory authority to adjudicate 
actions against members who are accused of 
illegal securities practices and to sanction 
members found to have violated the 
Exchange Act or SEC regulations. In NASD 
proceeding, the National Adjudicatory 
Council disciplined a member and its owner 
for, among other things, engaging in a 
manipulative scheme. The SEC reversed. 
NASD petitioned for review. The court 
found that, during the nearly seventy years 
that self-regulatory organizations had been 
recognized under the Exchange Act, 
Congress had never granted NASD a 
statutory right to seek judicial review of an 
SEC decision reversing disciplinary action 
taken by NASD as a first-level adjudicator 
under the statute. The court held that NASD, 
acting in its adjudicative capacity as a lower 
tribunal subject to SEC plenary review of its 
disciplinary decisions, was not an “aggrieved 
person.” NASD’s petition for review was 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
Kidd 
Commc’ns v. 
FCC, 427 
F.3d 1 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) 
 
Garland 
Silberman* 
Williams 
Kidd Communications appealed an FCC 
decision approving a transfer of Kidd’s radio 
station license to Paradise Broadcasting, Inc., 
from whom Kidd originally purchased the 
station. The transfer was effected in two steps 
pursuant to a California state court order: 
first, an involuntary assignment from Kidd to 
a trustee, and then the trustee’s voluntary 
assignment to Paradise. Kidd challenged the 
commission’s decision as inconsistent with 
both an FCC regulation prohibiting a seller 
from retaining a reversionary interest in a 
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station license and the commission’s general 
policy prohibiting a license holder from 
granting a security interest in a broadcast 
license (as opposed to in a station’s physical 
assets). The court ruled that the FCC 
inadequately explained why these related 
policies do not apply and failed to reconcile 
them with its competing policy of 
accommodating state court decisions. 
Decision vacated and case remanded. 
S. Cal. 
Edison Co. v. 
FERC, 415 
F.3d 17 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) 
 
Ginsburg 
Sentelle* 
Rogers 
Transmission operators (TO) and municipal 
customers petitioned for review of FERC 
orders disallowing proposed tariff provisions 
designed to recover cost differentials from 
additional expenses arising out of formation 
and maintenance of independent system 
operators (ISO). Held: The court ruled that 
TOs could recover cost differentials from 
new customers. Because the order by FERC 
contravened the explicit language of the 
FERC-approved ISO tariff schedule to which 
the tariffs must conform, the order was 
vacated as arbitrary and capricious and the 
case remanded. 
Northpoint 
Tech., Ltd. v. 
FCC, 412 
F.3d 145 
(D.C. Cir. 
2005) 
Edwards 
Henderson* 
Randolph 
An applicant for license to provide direct 
broadcast satellite (DBS) service petitioned 
for review of decision of FCC finding that 
agency was authorized to auction licenses to 
operate DBS service channels. The court 
held that (1) ORBIT Act provision providing 
that FCC did not have authority to assign by 
competitive bidding orbital locations or 
spectrum used for the provision of 
international or global satellite 
communications services was ambiguous and 
(2) FCC’s construction of ORBIT Act 
provision as allowing for auction for DBS 
licenses was unreasonable. Disputed decision 
vacated and case remanded. 
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Chamber of 
Commerce v. 
SEC, 412 
F.3d 133 
(D.C. Cir. 
2005) 
 
 
Ginsburg* 
Rogers 
Tatel 
Petitioner sought review of a rule 
promulgated by the SEC under the 
Investment Company Act. The disputed rule 
required that a mutual fund must have a 
board (1) with no less than 75 percent 
independent directors and (2) an 
independent chairman. The court held that 
SEC did not exceed its statutory authority in 
adopting the two conditions, and the 
commission’s rationales for the two 
conditions satisfied the APA. But the court 
found that the agency did violate the APA by 
failing adequately to consider the costs 
mutual funds would incur in order to comply 
with the conditions and by failing adequately 
to consider a proposed alternative to the 
independent chairman condition. Petition for 
review granted in part and case remanded. 
Am. Library 
Ass’n v. 
FCC, 406 
F.3d 689 
(D.C. Cir. 
2005) 
Edwards* 
Sentelle 
Rogers 
Petitioners challenged FCC’s “broadcast 
flag” regulations. A broadcast flag was a 
digital code embedded in a DTV 
broadcasting stream which prevented digital 
television reception equipment from 
redistributing broadcast content. The 
broadcast flag affects receiver devices only 
after a broadcast transmission is complete. 
The court held that the FCC acted outside 
the scope of its delegated authority when it 
adopted the disputed broadcast flag 
regulations. Petition granted and rule 
vacated.  
Nat’l 
Treasury 
Employees 
Union v. 
FLRA, 404 
F.3d 454 
(D.C. Cir. 
2005) 
 
Edwards 
Sentelle* 
Roberts 
The Federal Labor Relations Authority erred 
in holding that the U.S. Customs Service is 
not required to negotiate over a union 
proposal concerning the storage of handguns. 
Because the authority erred in failing to 
follow its own precedent in determining 
whether the bargaining proposal constituted 
an “appropriate arrangement” subjecting it 
to bargainability under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3), 
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the agency order was vacated and the case 
remanded. 
   
Edison Elec. 
Inst. v. EPA, 
391 F.3d 
1267 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) 
 
Edwards 
Randolph* 
Williams 
Edison Electric Institute and corporate and 
municipal dischargers brought petitions for 
review from final order of Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), alleging that 
EPA’s whole effluent toxicity test methods 
were invalid. The court held that (1) EPA 
accounted for departures from standard 
evaluation criteria, (2) EPA accounted for 
“false positive” test results, (3) EPA 
accounted for failure to establish detection 
limits, (4) EPA demonstrated ability of 
laboratories to conduct consistent testing, 
and (5) EPA established ability of test results 
to predict instream effects. Petitions denied. 
Vill. of 
Bensenville 
v. FAA, 376 
F.3d 1114 
(D.C. Cir. 
2004)  
Edwards 
Henderson* 
Williams 
Three suburbs petitioned for review of 
decision by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), which approved 
city’s request to impose passenger facility fee 
to fund airport modernization program, 
alleging violations of the Federal Aviation 
Act, APA, National Environmental Policy 
Act, and FAA regulations. The court held 
that (1) suburbs had standing to challenge the 
fee, (2) action was ripe, and (3) FAA acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in approving fee. 
Petitions granted and case remanded. 
U.S. 
Telecom 
Ass’n v. 
FCC, 359 
F.3d 554 
(D.C. Cir. 
2004)  
Edwards 
Randolph 
Williams* 
 
Telecommunications service providers 
petitioned for review of FCC order 
concerning incumbent local exchange 
carriers’ (ILEC’) obligation to unbundle 
network elements they made available to 
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). 
Holdings: (1) FCC could not delegate 
unbundling decisions to state utility 
commissions; (2) finding that CLECs were 
impaired absent access to mass market 
switches and high-capacity dedicated 
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transport facilities was unreasonable; (3) 
FCC could reasonably withhold unbundling 
orders, even in face of some impairment of 
CLECs’ ability to compete, where such 
unbundling would pose excessive 
impediments to infrastructure investment; 
(4) FCC reasonably declined to unbundle 
broadband loops, enterprise market switches, 
and call-related databases and signaling 
systems; (5) FCC reasonably determined that 
ILECs’ anti-impairment unbundling 
obligations were distinct from unbundling 
obligations they faced as condition for 
providing long-distance service; and (6) 
criteria established by FCC for determining 
whether CLEC was eligible to purchase 
unbundled enhanced exchange links were 
reasonable. Vacated and remanded in part, 
and dismissed in part. 
Cal. Indep. 
Sys. 
Operator 
Corp. v. 
FERC, 372 
F.3d 395 
(D.C. Cir. 
2004) 
 
Edwards 
Sentelle* 
Rogers 
California Independent System Operator 
Corporation (CAISO) and two California 
agencies petitioned for review of a final order 
of FERC replacing the governing board of 
CAISO. The court held that FERC did not 
have authority under the Federal Power Act 
to make or enforce the order. 
Sierra Club 
v. EPA, 356 
F.3d 296 
(D.C. Cir. 
2004)  
Sentelle 
Henderson 
Garland* 
Petitioner challenged two final actions of the 
EPA regarding ozone control plans for the 
Washington, D.C. area. The court agreed 
with petitioner’s principal contention that 
EPA was not authorized to grant conditional 
approval to plans that did nothing more than 
promise to do tomorrow what the act 
requires today. The court vacated the 
conditional approval and remanded the 
matter to EPA for further action. 
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Collins v. 
NTSB, 351 
F.3d 1246 
(D.C. Cir. 
2003) 
 
 
 
 
Randolph 
Rogers 
Williams* 
Commandant of Coast Guard affirmed finding 
of an ALJ that Coast Guard–licensed pilot 
committed misconduct under 1972 
International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea when he failed to sound 
warning signal after he ascertained that 
another vessel was not taking sufficient action 
to avoid collision. National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) reversed determination. 
Coast Guard appealed, and pilot intervened. 
The court held that (1) commandant was 
“person” entitled to appeal the determination; 
(2) appeal was timely; (3) at minimum, 
Skidmore deference was owed to Coast 
Guard’s interpretation of regulation under 
treaty; and (4) NTSB erred in failing to defer 
to Coast Guard’s reasonable application of 
rule to cases where mariners are certain that 
“sufficient action” is not “being taken by other 
[vessel] to avoid collision.” Reversed and 
remanded. 
Sierra Club v. 
EPA, 325 
F.3d 374 
(D.C. Cir. 
2003) 
Randolph 
Rogers 
Williams* 
Various environmental groups, two states, and 
trucking concerns petitioned for judicial 
review of regulations promulgated by the 
EPA to regulate emission of toxic chemicals 
from fuels. The court held that (1) the section 
of the Clean Air Act requiring the EPA to 
conduct a study to assess the “need for, and 
feasibility of, controlling emissions of toxic air 
pollutants” from motor vehicles and then, 
“based on” that study, to promulgate 
emissions standards to require the greatest 
degree of emission reduction achievable in 
light of “the availability and costs of the 
technology, and noise, energy, and safety 
factors, and lead time,” did not make validity 
of standards dependent on that of initial study; 
(2) EPA’s decision to adopt mere 
antibacksliding rule to prevent toxic emissions 
from increasing above historic levels rather 
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than more aggressive emissions cap was not 
arbitrary or capricious; (3) EPA did not 
sufficiently explain its decision not to require 
on-board diagnostic equipment for new 
heavy-duty vehicles over 14,000 pounds; and 
(4) EPA’s decision merely to list diesel 
exhaust as mobile air toxic that would be 
considered for purposes of future regulation 
did not present any issue ripe for judicial 
review. Petitioners’ claims denied in part, 
remanded in part, and dismissed as unripe in 
part. 
   
Motion 
Picture Ass’n 
of Am., Inc. 
v. FCC, 309 
F.3d 796 
(D.C. Cir. 
2002) 
 
Edwards* 
Henderson 
Rogers 
Petitioners challenged FCC rules mandating 
television programming with video 
descriptions. The court ruled that the statute 
does not instruct (or even permit) the FCC to 
promulgate regulations mandating video 
descriptions. The court reversed and vacated 
the FCC’s order. 
U.S. Air 
Tour Ass’n v. 
FAA, 298 
F.3d 997 
(D.C. Cir. 
2002)  
Edwards 
Henderson 
Garland* 
Air tour operators and environmental 
organizations petitioned for review of FAA 
rule imposing cap on total number of 
commercial air tours that operators could run 
in Grand Canyon National Park. The court 
held that (1) FAA’s change in its noise 
evaluation methodology for air tours was not 
arbitrary and capricious, (2) rule did not 
ignore needs of elderly and disabled, (3) 
challenges to rule raised by environmental 
groups were ripe for review, (4) remand was 
required to determine whether FAA 
unlawfully altered National Park Service’s 
definition of “substantial restoration of the 
natural quiet” in the Overflights Act, and (5) 
FAA’s noise-methodology supporting rule 
was arbitrary and capricious. Petitions granted 
in part, denied in part, and case remanded. 
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Sierra Club v. 
EPA, 292 
F.3d 895 
(D.C. Cir. 
2002) 
 
Ginsburg* 
Sentelle 
Tatel 
The Environmental Protection Agency 
promulgated a rule to establish the conditions 
under which it would consider certain 
wastewater treatment sludges “hazardous” 
within the meaning of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 
The Sierra Club and the Environmental 
Technology Council challenged the rule as 
unreasonable and as inconsistent with the 
plain meaning of the RCRA. The court 
dismissed the petitions because neither 
petitioner had standing to seek review. 
U.S. Telecom 
Ass’n v. FCC, 
290 F.3d 415 
(D.C. Cir. 
2002) 
Edwards 
Randolph 
Williams* 
Incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) 
petitioned for judicial review of orders of the 
FCC which adopted uniform national rule that 
required ILECs to lease variety of unbundled 
networks elements to competitive local 
exchange carriers (CLECs) in all geographic 
markets and customer classes and which 
ordered the unbundling of high frequency 
spectrum of copper loop to enable CLECs to 
provide digital subscriber line service. The 
court held that (1) FCC’s “impairment” 
standard was unlawful because it chose to 
adopt uniform national rule without regard to 
state of competitive impairment in any 
particular market and (2) FCC should not 
have entered unbundling order without first 
considering relevance of competition in 
broadband services coming from cable and, to 
lesser extent, satellite. Petitions for review 
granted and case remanded. 
Town of 
Stratford v. 
FAA, 285 
F.3d 84 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) 
Rogers 
Garland 
Silberman* 
The town of Stratford petitioned for review of 
an FAA decision concerning the 
Bridgeport-Sikorsky Memorial Airport and 
disposal of land from the Stratford Army 
Engine Plant. The court concluded that 
Stratford lacked prudential standing to pursue 
its claims that the FAA’s Environmental 
Impact Statement was inadequate under the 
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National Environmental Policy Act and that 
its remaining claims were without merit. 
Stratford’s petition was therefore denied. 
Univ. of 
Great Falls v. 
NLRB, 278 
F.3d 1335 
(D.C. Cir. 
2002) 
Sentelle* 
Rogers 
Williams 
The court agreed with the university that it 
was exempt from NLRB jurisdiction as a 
religiously operated institution under the 
doctrine of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). No Chevron 
deference was required. In applying the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the court 
inquired whether the university (a) held itself 
out to the public as a religious institution, (b) 
was nonprofit, and (c) was religiously 
affiliated. Finding that the university met 
these criteria, the decision and order of NLRB 
were vacated. 
   
Michigan v. 
EPA, 268 
F.3d 1075 
(D.C. Cir. 
2001) 
Ginsburg 
Edwards 
Sentelle* 
The EPA exceeded its authority under the 
Clean Air Act in proposing to promulgate and 
administer a federal operating permits 
program for areas where EPA believes the 
Indian country status is in question and in 
proposing to make state/tribe jurisdictional 
determinations on a case-by-case basis rather 
than through notice and comment rulemaking. 
NextWave 
Pers. 
Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. FCC, 
254 F.3d 130 
(D.C. Cir. 
2001) 
Sentelle 
Tatel* 
Garland 
Chapter 11 debtor challenged authority of 
FCC to cancel its broadband personal 
communications service (PCS) licenses for 
failure to make purchase price installment 
payments. The court held that (1) circuit 
appellate court’s decision reversing 
bankruptcy court’s determination that FCC 
could not cancel licenses was based on the 
bankruptcy court’s lack of jurisdiction rather 
than on merits of underlying dispute and thus 
was not res judicata except for those issues 
actually decided and (2) FCC was barred from 
canceling licenses solely for debtor’s failure to 
make installment payments after declaring 
bankruptcy. Reversed and remanded. 
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Trans Union 
Corp. v. FTC, 
245 F.3d 809 
(D.C. Cir. 
2001) 
Edwards 
Ginsburg 
Tatel* 
 
Consumer reporting agency petitioned for 
review of order of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) holding that agency’s sale 
of certain mailing lists containing names of 
consumers who met specific criteria was 
communication of “consumer reports” for a 
purpose that was impermissible under Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The court held 
that (1) agency did not properly challenge 
FTC’s statutory interpretation or launch 
specific substantial evidence challenge on its 
key findings, (2) FCRA was not 
unconstitutionally vague under Fifth 
Amendment due process guarantees, and (3) 
ban on sale of lists did not violate credit 
reporting agency’s First Amendment rights. 
Petition for review denied. 
Time Warner 
Entm’t Co. v. 
FCC, 240 
F.3d 1126 
(D.C. Cir. 
2001) 
 
Williams* 
Randolph 
Tatel 
This court addressed FCC regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992. It held that the horizontal rule was in 
excess of statutory authority, that the vertical 
rule did not survive intermediate scrutiny 
under the First Amendment, that the 
elimination of the majority shareholder 
exception was arbitrary and capricious, but 
that the basic 5 percent rule and 33 percent 
equity-and-debt rule were not arbitrary and 
capricious. Reversed and remanded in part 
and affirmed in part. 
  
